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08-03-2012, 04:15 AM
The University of Chicago

Law Review

Volume 79 Winter 2012 Number 1

© 2012 by The University of Chicago

SYMPOSIUM

Making Courts Matter: Politics and the

Implementation of State Supreme Court Decisions

Christopher Berry & Charles Wysong




INTRODUCTION

From Alexander Hamilton’s “least dangerous branch”1 to

Gerald Rosenberg’s “hollow hope,”2 the ability of courts to bring

about important policy change has long been the subject of

controversy. Indeed, even as the success of the new institutionalism

in the 1980s and 1990s has transformed “institutions matter” from a

battle cry into an aphorism, the idea that courts matter still encounters

a line of resistance that has long since fallen away from other branches

of American government. If Rosenberg is extreme in his contention

that “U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers of significant

social reform,”3 his point of view is shared by other scholars who

allow the courts only limited or indirect credit for important policy

reforms or suggest that court decisions merely ratify the prevailing

† Associate Professor, Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago.

†† JD 2012, Stanford Law School.

The research presented in this article was previously summarized in Christopher Berry and

Charles Wysong, School-Finance Reform in Red and Blue, 10 Educ Next 63 (Summer 2010),

online at http://educationnext.org/files/EdNext_20103_62.pdf (visited Oct 24, 2011).

1 Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 521, 522 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed).

2 See generally Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social

Change? (Chicago 1991).

3 Id at 338.

2 The University of Chicago Law Review [79:1

views of the governing elite.4 While the ranks of such revisionists

appear to be growing, however, they remain opposed and

outnumbered by those maintaining the traditional view of the courts

as, in Justice Hugo Black’s words, “havens of refuge for those who

might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered,”

or otherwise vulnerable to majority tyranny.5

Whether the United States courts have, in fact, made important

contributions to social change is ultimately an empirical question,

not a matter of legal theory. Yet, even when examining the same

facts on the ground, the two sides of this debate often reach opposing

conclusions.6 Nowhere is this divergence more apparent than in the

burgeoning literature evaluating the importance of Brown v Board

of Education,7 where one can find scholars arguing that the Court

made virtually no contribution to civil rights or school desegregation,8

others arguing that the case made a pivotal contribution in these

areas and to United States history more generally,9 as well as those in

between assigning the Court an important but more modest role.10

4 See, for example, Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

Revolutions, 82 Va L Rev 1, 7–18 (1996); Cornell W. Clayton and J. Mitchell Pickerill, The

Politics of Criminal Justice: How the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal

Justice Jurisprudence, 94 Georgetown L J 1385, 1411–23 (2006); Michael J. Klarman, How

Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 Va L Rev 1111, 1113–53, 1181–82 (2001);

Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 13–25, 224–29 (Chicago 1960); Robert A.

Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J

Pub L 279, 284–86 (1957).

5 Chambers v Florida, 309 US 227, 241 (1940). For explicit responses to the revisionist

critique, see, for example, Michael McCann, How the Supreme Court Matters in American

Politics: New Institutionalist Perspectives, in Howard Gillman and Cornell Clayton, eds, The

Supreme Court in American Politics 63, 63–76 (Kansas 1999); James F. Spriggs II, The Supreme

Court and Federal Administrative Agencies: A Resource-Based Theory and Analysis of Judicial

Impact, 40 Am J Pol Sci 1122, 1123–32, 1137–43 (1996). See also generally, for example, David

J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v. Board of Education,

80 Va L Rev 151 (1994).

6 For a collection of essays debating consequences of Supreme Court decisions, see

generally David A. Schultz, ed, Leveraging the Law: Using the Courts to Achieve Social Change

(Peter Lang 1998).

7 347 US 483 (1954).

8 See, for example, Rosenberg, Hollow Hope at 70 (cited in note 2); Gerald N.

Rosenberg, Brown Is Dead! Long Live Brown! The Endless Attempt to Canonize a Case, 80 Va

L Rev 161, 163–67, 171 (1994).

9 See, for example, Paul Finkelman, Book Review, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In

Defense of Brown, 118 Harv L Rev 973, 1017–29 (2005); Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court

and the Pursuit of Justice 15 (Hill & Wang 1998); Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts:

How a Dedicated Band of Lawyers Fought for the Civil Rights Revolution 264–362 (Basic

Books 1994).

10 See, for example, Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights

Movement, 80 Va L Rev 7, 10–11 (1994); Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of

Education, 90 Va L Rev 1693, 1693–96, 1705–20 (2004).

2012] Making Courts Matter 3


Little progress is likely to be made in this area by continuing to

rehash the same small set of “landmark” Supreme Court decisions.

The focus on singular court decisions has yielded fascinating

historical case studies but little in the way of generalizable empirical

evidence on the role of courts in the policymaking process. This

Article shifts the spotlight to state supreme courts, where the

operation of fifty institutionally comparable policymaking processes

provides an ideal laboratory for studying when and how court rulings

affect outcomes. A movement to reform school funding has spread

through the state court systems, producing dozens of similar cases

over thirty-five years. Because court-based education funding

reforms are both widespread and relatively homogenous in goals and

methods, they provide an excellent setting in which to empirically

explore the ability of courts to enact social change. Comparing

changes in funding between states where the funding system was

ruled unconstitutional with those where it was not, as well as

exploiting variation in the timing of the decisions, allows us to make

a statistical, rather than anecdotal, assessment of the courts’ impact.

Part II of this Article briefly introduces the legal framework and

background of school-finance judgments (SFJs) and surveys the

social science literature on SJF outcomes. Part III explains the data

and statistical strategy employed by this Article. Parts IV through VI

present the basic findings, evidence of a partisan impact on SFJ

outcomes, and the robustness of our results. In sum, our analysis

challenges the idea that courts are ineffectual in initiating policy

change, while providing some of the first quantitative evidence that

implementation is contingent on interactions between courts and

other political institutions.

I. BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE

The 1973 case of San Antonio Independent School District v

Rodriguez11 closed the door on education-finance reform through the

federal courts and directed plaintiffs to look to their respective state

constitutions for relief.12 Most state constitutions contain education

clauses that require the state to provide an “adequate education” or

a “thorough and efficient” education for all children,13 and plaintiffs

have relied on these provisions in seeking increases in the financial

11 411 US 1 (1973).

12 Id at 58–59.

13 See John C. Eastman, Reinterpreting the Education Clauses in State Constitutions, in

Martin R. West and Paul E. Peterson, eds, School Money Trials: The Legal Pursuit of

Educational Adequacy 55–64 (Brookings 2007).

4 The University of Chicago Law Review [79:1

resources devoted to public schools.14 Although the legal theories and

details vary from case to case, the goal of school-finance lawsuits is

to improve public education by directing additional financial

resources to underperforming and low-income schools.

Beginning with California’s Serrano v Priest15 in 1971, and spurred

by the Rodriguez decision, the constitutionality of school-finance

systems across the states has been under attack for nearly forty years.

By 2005, education reform advocates had filed 139 separate lawsuits in

45 states challenging their education funding systems on constitutional

grounds.16 In 28 of these states, the school-financing system has been

ruled unconstitutional in one or more court challenges.17

While school-finance lawsuits have attracted significant

attention in the legal community18 and a variety of state-specific

studies have been produced,19 nationwide empirical studies of the

effects of school-finance judgments (SFJs) have been relatively few.

Existing nationwide analyses suggest SFJs have reduced within-state

spending inequality by increasing state-financed education spending

for poor districts.20 Though many states do not reduce support for the

richest districts,21 the progressive increase in funding helps narrow

the gap in total spending between the richest and poorest districts.22

One group of authors—Sheila Murray, William Evans, and Robert

14 For an up-to-date state-by-state catalog of school-funding lawsuits, see National

Education Access Network, online at http://www.schoolfunding.info/ (visited Oct 24, 2011).

15 487 P2d 1241 (Cal 1971).

16 This data is based on West and Peterson, School Money Trials at 345–58 (cited in note 13).

17 “Equity” and “Adequacy” School Funding Liability Court Decisions (National Access

Network 2008), online at http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/equityandadequacytable.pdf

(visited Oct 24, 2011).

18 See, for example, James E. Ryan and Thomas Saunders, Foreword to Symposium on

School Finance Litigation: Emerging Trends or Dead Ends?, 22 Yale L & Pol Rev 463, 468–80

(2004).

19 See, for example, William S. Koski, The Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in

Educational Policy Reform Litigation, 55 Hastings L J 1077, 1104–1227 (2004).

20 See, for example, Sheila E. Murray, William N. Evans, and Robert M. Schwab,

Education-Finance Reform and the Distribution of Education Resources, 88 Am Econ Rev 789,

806 (1998) (examining data from 1972 to 1992 and finding inequality reduced by 19 to 34 percent).

See also David Card and A. Abigail Payne, School Finance Reform, the Distribution of School

Spending, and the Distribution of Student Test Scores, 83 J Pub Econ 49, 64–67 (2002)

(examining data from 1977 to 1992 and finding that “states in which the supreme court found

the school financing system unconstitutional have altered their funding systems so as to

redistribute aid to lower income districts”).

21 See Murray, Evans, and Schwab, 88 Am Econ Rev at 790 (cited in note 20).

22 See Card and Payne, 83 J Pub Econ at 49 (cited in note 20). David Card and Abigail

Payne also demonstrate that only court decisions in which the school-financing system is found

unconstitutional affect spending, whereas cases in which a state’s system is challenged but

upheld have no measurable effects, suggesting that the decision itself has a causal impact on

funding. Id at 64. They also provide evidence that the equalization of spending resulting from

SFJs leads to a narrowing of test scores across family background groups. Id at 76–79.

2012] Making Courts Matter 5


Schwab—argues that additional state funding for education resulting

from SFJs was financed through higher taxes rather than shifting

resources from other functions,23 although Katherine Baicker and

Nora Gordon find roughly a dollar decrease in other state

intergovernmental transfers to local government, for each dollar

increase in state education spending.24 Card and Payne find that local

governments also respond to increases in state education spending

by reducing their own revenue and spending on education. In other

words, there is evidence that localities “undo” state efforts at

increasing education spending after SFJs. For each dollar of

additional state aid for education, the net increase in total education

funding is fifty to sixty-five cents, after local spending changes are

taken into account.25

Researchers have also begun to explore variation among SFJ

outcomes. Matthew Springer, Keke Liu, and James Guthrie,26 as well

as Christopher Berry,27 attempt to differentiate the effects of equityand

adequacy-based SFJs on spending inequality. Prior to Rose v

Council for Better Education,28 court challenges to school-finance

systems rested on equity grounds.29 Rose, however, ushered in a

series of recent cases challenging state funding systems on adequacy

grounds.30 Although both equity and adequacy cases have usually

been grounded in a demand to provide greater resources for poor

students, adequacy cases acknowledge that resources may be

distributed unequally, to the extent that high-needs students require

23 Murray, Evans, and Schwab, 88 Am Econ Rev at 807 (cited in note 20).

24 See generally Katherine Baicker and Nora Gordon, The Effect of State Education

Finance Reform on Total Local Resources, 90 J Pub Econ 1519 (2006) (examining county-level

data from 1982 to 1997 estimating that SFJs result in a $48 per capita increase in state education

spending, but a $51 per capita reduction in other intergovernmental transfers from the state).

25 Card and Payne, 83 J Pub Econ at 50 (cited in note 20) (noting that increases in state

aid cause local governments to reduce taxes, generating a net increase of only fifty to sixty-five

cents).

26 Matthew G. Springer, Keke Liu, and James W. Guthrie, The Impact of School Finance

Litigation on Resource Distribution: A Comparison of Court-Mandated Equity and Adequacy

Reforms?, 17 Educ Econ 421, 436–41 (2009).

27 Christopher Berry, The Impact of School Finance Judgments on State Fiscal Policy, in

West and Peterson, eds, School Money Trials 213, 222–33 (cited in note 13).

28 790 SW2d 186 (Ky 1989).

29 See Koski, 55 Hastings L J at 1084–87 (cited in note 19).

30 See William S. Koski, The Evolving Role of the Courts in School Reform Twenty Years

after Rose, 98 Ky L J 789, 790–91 (2009). See generally, for example, Davis v South Dakota,

2011 WL 3849864 (SD); Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc v Rell,

990 A2d 206 (Conn 2008); Roosevelt Elementary School District No 66 v Bishop, 877 P2d 806

(Ariz 1994); Skeen v Minnesota, 505 NW2d 299 (Minn 1993); McDuffy v Secretary of Executive

Office of Education, 615 NE2d 516 (Mass 1993); Abbot v Burke, 575 A2d 359 (NJ 1990).

6 The University of Chicago Law Review [79:1

greater resources to obtain a satisfactory level of education.31

However, evidence so far does not demonstrate a statistically robust

difference in the fiscal effects of equity and adequacy cases.32

Likewise, Caroline Hoxby explores variation in SFJ outcomes by

abandoning the SFJ dummy-variable approach33 in favor of

computing economically meaningful parameters of school-finance

equalization plans on a state-by-state basis.34 She emphasizes that

SFJs can have quite different effects depending on the price and

income effects they impose, whereas the dummy-variable estimates

capture at best the average effects. In the context of the present

Article, Hoxby’s most important point is that the common SFJ

dummy-variable approach masks significant heterogeneity in the

experiences of different SFJs.35

In the remainder of this Article, we look to politics as one

explanation for the heterogeneous effects of SFJs across states. We

emphasize that a court’s ruling of the existing system as

unconstitutional is only the first step toward reform. Some court

orders provide instructions for how the legislature should fix the

system, but most orders let state politicians provide the remedy by

redesigning the finance system themselves.36 State leaders must then

craft a new finance system that garners the approval of the state

legislature and governor. Even after the court ruling, the reform

must pass through the usual lawmaking process of the state.

Therefore, even states with identical court rulings may end up with

very different reforms depending on how the legislature and the

governor respond to them. We investigate the relationship between

political conditions and court impact by estimating models that allow

the effects of an SFJ to vary depending on the partisan composition

of the state government at the time of the ruling. While this

approach captures only one of the many possible ways that politics

31 For a discussion of the different underlying conceptualizations of resource distribution

in equity and adequacy lawsuits, see Anna Williams Shavers, Rethinking the Equity vs.

Adequacy Debate: Implications for Rural School Finance Reform Litigation, 82 Neb L Rev 133,

146–60 (2003).

32 See Springer, Liu, and Guthrie, 17 Educ Econ at 421 (cited in note 26); Berry, School

Finance Judgments at 222–27 (cited in note 27).

33 Earlier studies included in econometric models a simple on-off switch—a dummy

variable—to indicate whether a court had issued an SFJ in a given state. This approach

captured only the average effect of SFJs and did not distinguish between legal, political,

economic, or other variations in the SFJ decisions or the context surrounding those decisions.

See, for example, Murray, Evans, and Schwab, 88 Econ L Rev at 801–04 (cited in note 20).

34 See Caroline M. Hoxby, All School Finance Equalizations Are Not Created Equal,

116 Q J Econ 1189, 1191–97 (2001).

35 Id at 1192.

36 See, for example, Rose, 790 SW2d at 215.

2012] Making Courts Matter 7


can influence the implementation of a court-ordered reform, our

results suggest that partisan differences are important.

II. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

A. Data

Our analysis examines information from Martin West and Paul

Peterson about SFJs and their outcomes for judgments issued

between 1988 and 2005. We exclude funding lawsuits not related to

general education funding37 and cases that are not the first SFJ in a

given state during our period of study. For the list of cases included

in our analysis, see Appendix Table 1.

Annual district-level financial and demographic information

comes from the Common Core of Data (CCD)38 and the US Census

Bureau Elementary-Secondary School System Finance Survey (F-33)39

when CCD data was not available (1988–1992 and 2005). Our

analysis considers only local school districts and parts of local

supervisory unions with at least one hundred students, as identified

37 We exclude fifteen cases from West and Peterson based on the content of the cases.

For a complete listing of all of the significant school-finance judgments from 1971 to 2005, see

West and Peterson, eds, School Money Trials at 345–58 (cited in note 13). These cases are

Kasayulie v Alaska, 1999 WL 34793400 (Alaska Super) (facilities); Crane Elementary School

District v Arizona, No 1 CA-CV 04-0076 (Ariz Ct App 2006) (capital funding); Hull v Albrecht,

950 P2d 1141 (Ariz 1997) and 960 P2d 634 (Ariz 1998) (capital funding); Roosevelt Elementary

School District Number 66 v Bishop, 877 P2d 806 (Ariz 1994) (capital funding); Haley v

Colorado Department of Education, No 02-CV-5149 (CO, Denver County District Court, 2002)

(special education); Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v Idaho, 129 P3d 1199

(Idaho 2005) (facilities); School Administrative District No 1 v Commissioner, Department of

Education, 659 A2d 854 (Me 1995) (upholding method for reducing funding); Durant v

Michigan, 566 NW2d 272 (Mich 1997) (special education); Board of Education of the City of

Millville v New Jersey Department of Education, 872 A2d 1052 (NJ 2005) (preschool); Abbott v Burke,

748 A2d 82 (NJ 2000) (preschool); Zuni Public School District v New Mexico, No CV-98-14-II (NM,

McKinley County District Court, May 26, 1999) (facilities); Tennessee Small School Systems v

McWherter, 894 SW2d 734 (Tenn 1995); Tennessee Small School Systems v McWherter, 91

SW3d 232 (Tenn 2002) (teacher salaries); and Neeley v West Orange-Cove Consolidated

Independent School District, 176 SW3d 746 (Tex 2005) (addressing property taxes, not school

funding). We include two cases that settled with an agreement for reform: Mock v Kansas, No

91-CV-1009 (KS, Shawnee County District Court, Oct 14, 1991), available at Philip C. Kissam,

Constitutional Thought and Public Schools: An Essay on Mock v. State of Kansas, 31

Washburn L J 474, 489–504 (1992); and Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v Minnesota, No

95-14800 (Minn, Hennepin County Dist Ct 2000), consolidated with Xiong v Minnesota, No 98-

2816 (Minn, Hennepin County Dist Ct 2000).

38 National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data, online at

http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/bat/ (visited Oct 24, 2011) (providing demographic and fiscal information

about public elementary and secondary schools).

39 US Census Bureau, Public School Finance Data, online at http://www.census.gov/govs

/school/ (visited Oct 24, 2011) (providing finance data, including revenues, expenditures, debt,

and assets, for elementary and secondary public school systems).

8 The University of Chicago Law Review [79:1

by the CCD. To address apparent data errors,40 we follow the

approach of Murray, Evans, and Schwab,41 and therefore exclude

districts with total spending per pupil above the ninety-ninth

percentile for each given state-year.42 Additional district

demographic information, such as the proportion of the population

ages five to seventeen and the proportion of school-aged children

living in poverty, comes from the US Census Bureau’s “Model-

Based Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates” for most years.43

Because district poverty information is not available for every year,

the poverty estimates from the closest available survey year are used.

For example, the district poverty estimates for 1996, 1997, and 1998

all use the data from 1997. State-level political control and

demographic information, including population and per capita

income, come from the US Census Bureau’s “Statistical Abstract of

the United States”44 and the National Governors Association

website.45

Local-school-district spending in the United States is financed

by three sources of funding: local revenues raised by the district,

primarily through property taxes; state aid; and federal aid.

Together, state and local funding constitute over 90 percent of school

funding.46 On average, state and local funding each account for

roughly half of this total, although there is substantial variation

across states in the allocation of funding responsibilities between

state and local governments. Most state spending on education

consists of transfers to local districts rather than direct delivery of

40 For example, one district that had 237 students reported over $500,000 in per-pupil

total funding.

41 Murray, Evans, and Schwab, 88 Am Econ Rev at 795 (cited in note 20).

42 We also exclude two districts with implausibly low funding per pupil, as well as Hawaii

and Washington, DC, because each has only one school district.

43 US Census Bureau, Model-Based Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, online at

http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/ (visited Oct 24, 2011). Additionally, for 1989 and 2005,

the district demographic information comes from National Center for Education Statistics,

School District Demographics System, online at http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sdds/index.aspx

(visited Oct 24, 2011).

44 US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2007 253 table 400, online

at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/07statab/election.pdf (visited Feb 15, 2011); US

Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1990 259 table 434, online at

http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1990-01.pdf (visited Feb 15, 2011).

45 National Governors Association, Past Governors Bios, online at http://www.nga.org/cms

/home/governors/past-governors-bios.html (visited Oct 24, 2011).

46 National Center for Education Statistics, Revenues and Expenditures for Public

Elementary and Secondary Education: School Year 2008–09 (Fiscal Year 2009) 5 (2011), online

at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011329.pdf (visited Oct 24, 2011).

2012] Making Courts Matter 9


educational services.47 The federal government has never provided a

significant portion of funding for public education but rather limits

its role to funding specific programs, such as the Free and Reduced

Price Lunch Program, Title I funding for schools that serve students

living in poverty, and various programs supporting special education.

B. Empirical Strategy

In the analyses that follow, we estimate the impact of SFJs on

state, local, and total funding for school districts. While SFJs require

a policy response from the state government, and therefore are

expected to have a direct impact on state funding, they may also

have an indirect effect on local funding—that is, the revenue raised

by local school districts. Indeed, one concern over the efficacy of

SFJs is that local districts may reduce their own taxes in response to

increases in state aid, thereby undermining state-level efforts to

increase school spending. For example, David Card and Abigail

Payne find that a dollar of increased state aid to a local school

district results in only fifty to sixty-five cents in increased spending.48

Therefore, to provide a more comprehensive picture of the effect of

SFJs, we estimate models of both state and local funding. In

addition, models of total funding capture the net effect of SFJs.49

We use a differences-in-differences strategy to identify the effect

of court-ordered education reform on school district funding.

Specifically, we estimate a series of regression models of the basic

form:

= + + ∙ +

∙ + ∙ +

where represents per-pupil funding (in constant 2007 dollars) for

district located in state at time , and and are district- and

year-fixed effects, respectively. With the inclusion of district-fixed

effects, identification in our models comes from within-district

changes in funding following an SFJ. The fixed effects account for

all, observable or unobservable, time-invariant attributes of the

47 A notable exception is Hawaii, which has the nation’s only entirely state-run school

system. See Hawai’i State Department of Education, Introduction, Organization, online at

http://doe.k12.hi.us/about/intro_org.htm (visited Oct 24, 2011).

48 Card and Payne, 83 J Pub Econ 49, 50 (cited in note 20). But see Baicker and Gordon,

90 J Pub Econ at 1532 (cited in note 24).

49 Because federal aid also contributes to local district spending, total funding is not

simply the sum of state and local funding. However, because we do not expect federal funding

to be influenced by a state SFJ—an expectation that is borne out in the data, see Table 2—we

do not estimate additional models for this variable. Nevertheless, estimates of federal funding

are implicit in the difference between results for total funding and the sum of the results for

state and local funding.

10 The University of Chicago Law Review [79:1

district, including the attributes of the state in which the district is

located. Meanwhile, the year-fixed effects purge the estimates of

national trends that affect all districts, such as economic conditions

or changes in federal education policy. Our main variable of interest

is , which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the state’s schoolfinance

system has been ruled unconstitutional in a court challenge.

Specifically, the dummy variable is set to 1 in the year after the

decision and each subsequent year.50 In most specifications, we also

interact with state partisan control or district poverty, as will be

explained in the analyses that follow. is a vector of time-varying

district characteristics and is a vector of time-varying state

characteristics, both of which will be specified below. Finally, are

the errors, clustered by state, which account for arbitrary correlation

in the residuals among districts within the same state and serial

correlation of repeated observations from the same district.

We include time-varying state-level characteristics that are

expected to influence state funding of education. We control for the

fraction of the state’s population over sixty-five to account for the

possibility that the elderly oppose increases in school spending.51 We

also control for the fraction of the population that is of school age,

which captures aggregate demand for educational services. At the

same time, increasing per-pupil spending is proportionally more

expensive where children constitute a larger fraction of the

population. We control for per capita income in the state, reflecting

“Wagner’s Law” that demand for government services increases with

income52—that is, the elasticity of government spending with respect

to individual income is greater than 1. We also include the square of

state income to allow for the possibility that the demand for

educational spending is not unbounded. Finally, we include two

dummy variables for years of unified Democratic and unified

Republican control, respectively, of the upper chamber, the lower

chamber, and the governorship, which capture partisan differences in

state education funding. The omitted category is divided

government.

We also control for time-varying characteristics of school districts

that are expected to influence either their receipt of state funding or

their propensity to raise their own local revenue. We include the

50 We allow for a one-year lag for the SFJ to take effect because we assume that any

changes in policy made as a result of the decision will be reflected in the next year’s budget at

the earliest.

51 James M. Poterba, Demographic Structure and the Political Economy of Public

Education, 16 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt 48, 49 (1997).

52 Adolf Wagner, Three Extracts on Public Finance, in Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T.

Peacock, eds, Classics in the Theory of Public Finance 1, 7 (Macmillan 1958).

2012] Making Courts Matter 11


number of students in the district to allow for the possibility that

large districts operate differently from small districts, perhaps due to

economies of scale.53 We control for the percentage of the student

population living in poverty, which we expect to make the district

more likely to receive state funding and less able to raise local

funding. The fraction of students with an individualized education

plan (IEP) is an indicator of special needs, which we expect to result

in higher spending. We also include the proportion of the student

population that is African American and the proportion that is

Hispanic. Although we have no reason to believe that these two

variables directly cause changes in education funding, we have access

to relatively few district covariates and include these due to the

possibility that they are correlated with other relevant factors in the

district, such as property values or population growth.54

Descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our analysis are

presented in Table 1.

III. BASELINE RESULTS

We begin by estimating a set of baseline models that assess the

overall impact of SFJs on education funding. Models 1 through 3 of

Table 2 present the within-district estimates for total, state, and local

funding. The point estimates indicate that state funding (Model 2)

increases following an SFJ by about $775 per pupil, while local

funding (Model 3) declines by roughly $400. Total funding (Model 1)

increases by a little over $300.55 This pattern is broadly consistent

with the results shown by Berry, who finds, using state aggregate

data and a longer time series going back to 1971, that SFJs lead to

increasing centralization of education funding to the state level.56

However, none of the SFJ effects estimated in Models 1 through 3

achieve statistical significance. In other words, although on average

SFJs led to increases in total and state funding and reductions in

local funding, there is substantial variation across states and districts

in the impact of SFJs.

53 See Murray, Evans, and Schwab, 88 Am Econ Rev at 803 (cited in note 20). With the

dependent variable measured in per-pupil terms, a negative coefficient on the number of

students indicates economies of scale.

54 For a more general analysis of the role of district racial composition in school-finance

litigation, see generally James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform,

98 Mich L Rev 432 (1999).

55 The change in total funding is not exactly equal to the change in state funding plus the

change in local funding because federal funding, which we do not estimate directly, may also

change after an SFJ. As is implicit in this table and those that follow, changes in federal

funding after an SFJ are a negligible part of the total changes in funding.

56 See Berry, School Finance Judgments at 214, 227–31 (cited in note 27).

12 The University of Chicago Law Review [79:1

Models 4 through 6 isolate one important source of variation in

the impact of SFJs by estimating an interaction between the SFJ

dummy and an indicator for district poverty. Because most lawsuits

were aimed, in one way or another, at increasing funding for poor

districts specifically, there is no reason that an SFJ must affect

funding for the average district. Our estimated interaction term

allows for the impact of an SFJ to be different for poor districts

relative to other districts. Specifically, we use an indicator for

whether a district is in the highest quartile, defined relative to its

state and year, in the proportion of students living in poverty.57 All of

the estimated interactions between district poverty and SFJ status

are highly significant statistically, indicating that SFJs led to changes

in funding disproportionately for poor districts. The total effect of

SFJs on the funding of poor districts is the sum of the SFJ main

effect plus the SFJ times poor interaction, which is reported at the

bottom of the table along with the corresponding standard errors.

Taking this sum, one can see that poor districts received $1,260 more

in state funding, $600 less in local funding, and $640 more in total

funding as a result of SFJs, although the estimates for local revenue

are very imprecise. The net increase of $640 in total funding for poor

districts is fairly modest substantively, considering that total perpupil

funding in our sample is a little over $14,000 on average. Put

differently, $640 represents about one-eighth of a standard deviation

in total per-pupil funding. The results for nonpoor districts follow the

same pattern—a shift from local to state revenue resulting in a

modest increase in total funding—but are even smaller in magnitude

and insignificant statistically.

The main effect of the district-poverty dummy variable—which

can be interpreted as the effect of being in the highest poverty

quartile in the absence of an SFJ—is negative and significant for total

revenue (Model 4). Interestingly, the negative differential in total

funding is due to poor districts receiving less state aid (Model 5),

rather than to differences in locally raised revenue (Model 6). Again,

according to the SFJ-poverty interaction, SFJs lead to significant

increases in state funding, as well as total funding, resulting in poor

districts receiving more total revenue after an SFJ, compared both to

nonpoor districts with an SFJ and to poor districts without an SFJ.

57 Continuous measures of poverty yield comparable results, as will be discussed below.

We begin with the dichotomous variable because we have theoretical reasons to expect that

the relationship between the impact of an SFJ and district-level poverty will not be continuous.

That is, we expect an SFJ to result in increases in funding for poor districts, though not

necessarily reductions in funding for other districts.

2012] Making Courts Matter 13


Overall, the results shown in Models 4 through 6 are consistent

with results from prior studies finding that SFJs result in modest

reductions in the inequality of education funding within a state.58 At

the same time, while these prior studies utilize state-aggregate

measures of inequality, we are the first to produce estimates from

district-level data, demonstrating that SFJs generate increases in

state aid to high-poverty districts specifically.

Among the control variables, the point estimates are generally

in the expected direction, although only a few achieve statistical

significance. Districts spend less per student when enrollment

increases, suggesting the existence of economies of scale. Districts

spend more when the proportion of students with an IEP increases.

Given that IEPs generally apply to students with special needs, this

result is unsurprising. Finally, districts receive more funding in the

years when Republicans control the state government.59 This result is

somewhat surprising in light of the popular perception that

Republicans are the party of fiscal conservatism, although it is

possible that increased education funding comes at the expense of

reductions in other expenditures. We will have more to say about

partisan differences in the next Section.

IV. PARTISAN DIFFERENCES

The results presented in the previous Section recapitulate the

major findings from prior studies—namely, that SFJs lead to

transfers of fiscal responsibilities from local to state governments,

increases in the overall level of education funding, and reductions in

funding inequality. In this Section, we investigate whether the impact

of an SFJ varies depending on the partisan control of the state

government at the time of the decision. We focus on patterns of

partisan control at the time of the decision because the sitting

government is the one obliged to craft a policy response to the

court’s order.60 While later governments are also constrained by the

court’s prior rulings, they are not charged with bringing the schoolfunding

system into compliance in the first place. Ultimately,

whether the government in place at the time of the decision leaves

58 See, for example, Berry, School Finance Judgments at 233 (cited in note 27); Card and

Payne, 83 J Pub Econ at 66 (cited in note 20). But see Murray, Evans, and Schwab, 88 Am

Econ Rev at 806 (cited in note 20). High poverty does not necessarily imply low spending, so

the results in Table 2 do not speak directly to the issue of spending inequality.

59 See Table 2.

60 Of course, there are instances in which the sitting legislature and governor fail to agree

on a response to the court’s order before their term is up, thereby leaving the problem for their

successors to tackle. We discuss these issues below.

14 The University of Chicago Law Review [79:1

an enduring mark on the system is an empirical question, and later

we will discuss the robustness of our results as compared to

alternative ways of modeling partisan influence.

We begin by creating three dummy variables representing,

respectively, unified Democratic control of the state legislature and

governorship at the time of the court decision, unified Republican

control, and divided government. For example, the first dummy

variable will equal 1 for years after an SFJ if Democrats controlled

both houses of the legislature and the governorship in the year of the

decision, 0 otherwise. This approach allows us to test whether the

within-district difference in funding before versus after an SFJ is

different depending on the partisan composition of the state

government at the time of the decision. The omitted category is

again no SFJ. Thus, identification in these models comes both from

within-district variation (to estimate the change in spending after an

SFJ) and from between-state variation (to estimate the differential

effects of the three configurations of partisan control). We continue

to include the full set of state and district control variables used in

Table 2, although to conserve space we do not report their results.

Appendix Table 1 lists the cases used in our analysis and the

configuration of partisan control of the state government at the time

of the decision. From the outset, we caution that there are only three

SFJs issued during periods of unified Republican government.61

There are seven SFJs handed down to unified Democratic

governments,62 and eleven SFJs delivered to divided governments.63

While we have nearly 200,000 district-level observations in our data

set, our ability to test for partisan differences in outcomes is limited

by the number of cases decided under each regime.

Models 1 through 3 of Table 3 indicate that SFJs handed down

to Democratic state governments result in the greatest changes in

education funding. Specifically, when Democrats are in control at the

time of an SFJ, state revenue subsequently increases by $1,750 per

pupil, while local revenue declines by $630, resulting in an increase in

total funding of $1,150. Meanwhile, SFJs implemented under divided

government result in roughly offsetting increases in state funding and

decreases in local funding, with negligible average effects on total

funding. Finally, when a Republican-controlled government

responds to an SFJ, the result is modest increases in both state and

61 These SFJs were issued for New Hampshire, Ohio, and Wyoming.

62 These SFJs were handed down to Alabama, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Tennessee,

Vermont, and West Virginia.

63 These SFJs were delivered to Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota,

Montana, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, and Texas.

2012] Making Courts Matter 15


local funding, summing to a total increase in funding of $365 per

student. Most of the coefficients are imprecisely estimated, however.

Only the effect of Democratic reform on total funding is significant

at the conventional 5 percent level, while the Republican effect on

total funding is significant at 10 percent.

The hypothesis tests implicit in Table 3 indicate whether each

type of partisan reform results in a difference in spending compared

with not having had an SFJ. It is also important to test whether the

different configurations of partisan control have different effects

from each other. These hypothesis tests are reported in Table 3A.

The evidence shows that Democratic-controlled reforms do not have

the same total effect as a reform implemented under divided

government. However, all of the other tests fail to reject the

hypothesis that reforms issued under different partisan

configurations have equal effects.

The imprecision of the estimated effects in Models 1 through 3

again suggests that there is substantial heterogeneity across districts

in the effects of SFJs, even under the same regime of partisan

control. In Models 4 through 6, we allow the effects of SFJs to differ

for poor and nonpoor districts within each regime type. That is, we

have a quadruple-difference model in which we estimate the

difference in the change in spending after an SFJ between poor and

nonpoor districts across three different regimes of partisan control.

Using this strategy, it becomes apparent that the reforms

implemented by Democratic state governments have significantly

different effects from those implemented by divided or Republican

governments.

First, note that the Democratic-reform-times-poor-districtinteraction

term is substantively small and statistically insignificant

for total revenue, indicating that poor districts do not fare differently

than other districts under a Democratically controlled SFJ. The main

effect of Democratic reform remains positive and significant. In

other words, all districts—poor and nonpoor alike—see increases in

funding following an SFJ implemented by a Democratic state

government. According to Models 5 and 6, poor districts do experience

a greater shift from local to state funding than nonpoor districts

under a Democratic SFJ, but the decrement to local revenue

essentially offsets the increment to state revenue, hence the null

result for total revenue.

By contrast, SFJs implemented by divided or Republican state

governments generate significant increases in funding for poor

districts, relative to other districts. That is, the main effects for split

and Republican SFJs are insignificant, while the interactions with the

16 The University of Chicago Law Review [79:1

poor-district indicator are positive and significant. Under both types

of regimes, poor districts see reductions in local funding that are

more than offset by increases in state funding, resulting in increases

in total funding. Although the point estimate for the SFJ times poordistrict

interaction is larger for Republican governments ($622) than

for divided governments ($498), we cannot reject the hypothesis that

they are equal, as shown in Table 3A.

In sum, an SFJ under each type of partisan regime results in a

change to the school-funding system after the ruling, and

Democratically implemented SFJs have significantly different effects

from SFJs implemented under Republican or divided state

governments. Specifically, Democratic SFJs result in increases in

total funding for both poor and nonpoor districts, whereas a

Republican or divided government SFJ results in increases in

funding for poor districts disproportionately. All three types of SFJs

lead to a shift in funding responsibility from local to state

governments, though to differing degrees.

Thus far in our analysis, we have lumped together all nonpoor

districts within a state into a single category. To produce a more

comprehensive picture of the partisan effects of SFJs, we next extend

our analysis to include interactions between SFJ status, partisan

regime type at the time of the decision, and indicators for four

quartiles of the within-state distribution of district-level poverty. In

other words, we divide each state’s districts into four quartiles based

on the proportion of students in poverty and then allow each of the

three different types of SFJs—Democratic, Republican, and divided

state government—to have differential effects for each quartile. This

allows us to assess, in a nonparametric fashion, the effect of an SFJ

across the spectrum of district poverty. As before, the inclusion of

district- and year-fixed effects means that our estimates of the effect

of an SFJ come from within-district changes in spending after the

decision. We simply compare these within-district changes across

different combinations of partisan control and district poverty.

The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4. The omitted

category of district poverty is the second-poorest quartile, so the

coefficients for the remaining quartiles should be interpreted as

differences with respect to this omitted category. However, these

complex interactions are more easily presented graphically, which we

do in Figure 1. Each bar in the graph represents the total effect of an

SFJ—that is, the within-district change in spending after the

decision—for each category of partisan control and district poverty,

computed from the coefficients shown in Table 4. Meanwhile,

2012] Making Courts Matter 17


Table 4A presents associated tests for differences in the effects of

SFJs across various partisan and poverty groups.

The more detailed results depicted in Figure 1 indicate that SFJs

crafted by Democratic governments result in total funding increases

across the board. Districts in every poverty quartile see a shift from

local to state funding after an SFJ, with a net increase in funding

ranging from roughly $1,000 to $1,300 per pupil. While a few of the

differences between quartiles are significant statistically, they are

substantively small relative to the overall level of the funding

increases. Indeed, if anything, the results indicate that the most

affluent districts fare better than the poorest districts, in terms of

total funding, after a Democratic SFJ, although this difference is not

statistically significant.

SFJ reforms implemented under divided government produce

decidedly different results. There is a shift from local to state

funding, but the change in state funding is monotonically increasing

district poverty. The poorest quartile of districts receives significantly

greater increases in state funding than any other quartile. Moreover,

the poorest quartile is the only one to see positive net changes in

total funding. Overall, divided government SFJs appear to represent

a more or less straightforward redistribution of funding toward the

poorest districts. The net effects on state education funding appear

to be neutral, as further evidenced by Model 1 of Table 3, showing

little change in total education funding after an SFJ under divided

government. That said, the net increase in total funding for poor

districts is substantively small, amounting to roughly $350 per

student, or only 7 percent of a standard deviation in total funding.

Republican-controlled SFJs present yet a third distinct pattern

of funding reforms. Under Republican reforms, there is a shift from

local to state funding only for the poorest districts. Districts in the

most affluent quartile face cuts in state funding, but they are able to

more than compensate for these reductions by increasing their own

local revenue. In other words, Republican SFJs involve increasing

centralization of funding for the poorest districts and increasing

decentralization of funding for the richest districts. The middle two

quartiles are essentially unaffected. On net, both the poorest and the

richest districts see increases in total funding, the former courtesy of

state aid and the latter financed from their own tax base. Indeed, the

richest districts in Republican states are the only quartile under any

partisan regime to experience an increase in local funding following

an SFJ.

Which partisan arrangement leads to the best results for poor

districts after an SFJ? Clearly, SFJs implemented by Democrats

18 The University of Chicago Law Review [79:1

produce the largest net increases in funding. However, by delivering

roughly equivalent funding increases to districts at all income levels,

Democratic SFJs will do little to reduce the overall level of funding

inequality in their states. On the other hand, SFJs implemented by

divided or Republican governments deliver concentrated benefits to

poor districts, thereby reducing, albeit moderately, the funding

differential between poor and more affluent districts. However,

especially under divided government SFJs, the actual flow of new

dollars into poor districts is more meager than when Democrats are

in control. Assessing which sort of reform produces the greatest

benefits would require a richer theory and empirical analysis of the

connection between student outcomes and the level and inequality of

school funding.

We do not offer a substantive political explanation for the

differential partisan responses to state SFJs. One simple conjecture

would be that political actors use the court rulings as a pretense to

enact policy changes that they were otherwise predisposed to make

anyway. Yet, it is not clear why such a pretense would be necessary

in a state dominated by one party. For example, when Democrats

control the legislature and governorship, they presumably will set the

policy they want absent court intervention, so it is not obvious why

an SFJ should elicit a greater response from Democrats than from

Republicans. It is possible that supermajoritarian voting requirements

within the legislature prevent the dominant party from attaining its

ideal policies even under unified government, and that court rulings

help surmount such hurdles. However, a comprehensive account of

court influence over state policymaking is beyond the scope of this

paper and so we leave the theoretical underpinnings of our results as

fodder for future research.

V. ROBUSTNESS

In additional analyses not reported, we have explored the

robustness of our results to various changes in model specification

and variable definitions. First, we examined sensitivity to our

treatment of partisan control. In the models reported above, we

coded each SFJ according to the partisan alignment in the year of the

decision. As an alternative, we also reran the models using

contemporaneous measures of partisan control—that is, interacting

the SFJ dummy with indicators of partisan control in the current year

for all years after the decision. The signs of the coefficients were

unchanged, but they became much less precisely estimated when

using the contemporaneous measures of partisanship. This leads us

to conclude that state party control at the time of the decision

2012] Making Courts Matter 19


captures an important determinant of the political response to the

court decision.

As noted in our discussion of the school-finance litigation

movement, many states have had more than one court ruling on

education finance.64 The rulings that determine our coding of the SFJ

dummy variable are listed in Appendix Table 1. However, some

states had rulings in place prior to the beginning of our study period,

and some states had additional rulings that came later. We have

explored various sensitivity analyses as to the coding of the SFJ

dummy. For example, we recoded the dummy variable to reflect

cases decided before the beginning of our study period and reran the

models. We also tried including indicator variables for the existence

of reform decisions that came before or after the cases used in our

analysis. Our results did not change importantly, although we did

observe that the first reform case tends to have the largest effect on

fiscal outcomes.

A lingering concern with our results may be that the filing of

lawsuits is endogenously related to political control of the state

government. First, we note that because nearly all states—forty-five

of fifty—were subject to at least one education-finance lawsuit, the

central issue is not whether a state would face a suit but when. One

possibility is that education-reform advocates may time the filing of

their lawsuits to take advantage of what they view as particularly

favorable political conditions. Another possibility is that advocates

might resort to litigation only when the legislative and political

process fails to provide reform. Therefore, endogenous timing by

litigants might potentially bias our results in either direction.

We believe that the possibility of endogenous lawsuit timing visà-

vis political regime is not a major concern for three reasons: the

amount of time between lawsuit filing and the court decision is

unpredictable, political regimes often change between the lawsuit

filing and decision, and lawsuits do not appear to be precipitated by

changes in political regime. Among the twenty-three cases that

contribute to our estimate of SFJ reform, the length of time from the

initial filing through the final appellate court decision ranged from

less than a year to nine years. On average, the process took four

years. Due to the length of time the suits take and the variability of

the speed of the adjudication process, advocates could not effectively

time their lawsuits to specific political regimes. In almost half of the

cases—eleven out of twenty-three—the political regime changed

between the time of filing and time of decision. When political

64 See note 16 and accompanying text.

20 The University of Chicago Law Review [79:1

control changes more rapidly than lawsuits can be adjudicated,

reform advocates cannot time their lawsuits to be decided under a

specific regime. Further, SFJ lawsuits do not appear to be motivated

by a change in regime preceding case filing. On average, the political

regime in the state was stable for six years prior to the filing of a

case. In only three cases did the regime change in the year of the

lawsuit filing, and for each of those three cases, the political regime

changed again before the lawsuit was decided. Thus, we do not see

evidence that endogenous timing of lawsuits is likely to be an

important source of bias for our results.

CONCLUSION

The state experience with school-finance litigation provides

evidence that courts have played a significant role in at least this one

realm of social reform. We find statistically significant differences in

education funding following court judgments overturning a state’s

school-financing system. In particular, Democratic, Republican, and

divided state governments produce significantly different education

spending patterns following an SFJ, once we account for the relative

poverty of the school districts. Further, SFJ reforms overall had a

significantly different impact on low-spending school districts than

on high-spending school districts. The effects of a court decision are

contingent on the pattern of partisan control in place at the time.

Thus, our analysis challenges the idea that courts are ineffectual in

initiating policy change while providing some of the first quantitative

evidence that implementation is contingent on interactions between

courts and other political institutions.

2012] Making Courts Matter 21


FIGURE 1. EFFECT OF SFJ ON SCHOOL FUNDING BY PARTY

CONTROL AND POVERTY QUARTILE

Notes: This is a graphical depiction of the results shown in Table 4. Bars represent the sum of the

coefficients for the partisan SFJ main effect plus its interaction with district poverty. The first bar in each

section indicates the highest poverty quartile, while the fourth bar indicates the lowest poverty quartile.

ÃÍãÏ ÃÈæ ÒäØ
08-03-2012, 04:16 AM
-1000

0

1000

2000

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

Effect of SFJ

Divided

Total Funding

Democratic Republican

-1000

0

1000

2000

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

Effect of SFJ

Divided

State Funding

Democratic Republican

-1000

0

1000

2000

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

Effect of SFJ

Divided

Local Funding

Democratic Republican

22 The University of Chicago Law Review [79:1

TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable

Name

Description Mean

Standard

Deviation

Minimum Maximum

State-Level Covariates

Stpop State population (in millions) 9.35 8.27 0.45 35.84

Stpop2 State population squared 155.85 267.74 0.21 1,284.65

Pcincome Per capita income (in thousands of

constant dollars)

30.44 4.79 18.29 47.27

Pcincome2 Per capita income squared 949.82 306.40 334.46 2,234.10

Aged Percent of state population over 65 12.01 3.27 16.00 18.77

Kids Percent of state population under 18 18.45 1.88 6.40 26.87

Democrat Dummy for complete Democratic

control of state government during

a given year

0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00

Republican Dummy for complete Republican

control of state government during

a given year

0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00

District-Level Covariates

P517 Percent of district population ages 5

to 17

18.68 4.05 4.80 71.70

Students Log of number of students in the

district

7.15 1.29 4.61 13.81

Black Percent African American students

in the district

6.80 15.81 0.00 100.00

Hispanic Percent Hispanic students in the

district

7.70 16.55 0.00 100.00

IEP Percent of students with an IEP 11.59 5.69 0.00 100.00

P517_pov Percent of kids (ages 5 to 17) in the

district living in poverty

15.11 10.20 0.00 100.00

Dependent Variables

Trev Total district revenue per pupil

(in constant 2007 $)

14,263.25 4,871.28 3,619.42 140,747.10

Srev State district revenue

(in constant 2007 $)

6,434.73 3,625.43 0.00 116,863.90

Lrev Local district revenue

(in constant 2007 $)

6,694.98 4,787.76 0.00 70,096.20

N = 191,832

2012] Making Courts Matter 23


TABLE 2. BASELINE REGRESSION

(1) Total

Revenue

(2) State

Revenue

(3) Local

Revenue

(4) Total

Revenue

(5) State

Revenue

(6) Local

Revenue

SFJ Dummy 307.2 777.9 −409.0 203.1 627.6 −348.1

(217.2) (602.5) (523.3) (227.3) (617.6) (532.5)

Poor

Dummy *

SFJ

439.8*** 631.6*** −254.3**

(148.0) (217.6) (102.5)

Poor

Dummy

−188.10*** −177.90* 33.66

(62.16) (104.50) (57.83)

Democrat −116.1 −314.4 227.1 −115.8 −314.7 227.5

(101.2) (204.3) (170.2) (101.1) (204.5) (170.3)

Republican 231.70** 88.67 71.23 231.90** 88.72 71.25

(113.5) (167.7) (131.7) (113.8) (167.7) (131.7)

Stpop 31.94 −229.70 281.70 25.55 −236.00 283.10

(182.70) (312.10) (255.70) (182.0) (310.40) (255.00)

Stpop2 2.616 0.222 1.395 2.725 0.328 1.373

(2.946) (4.966) (4.684) (2.934) (4.930) (4.667)

Pcincome 120.3 686.1 −663.7* 122.7 690.0 −665.4*

(325.8) (491.1) (359.1) (325.6) (490.8) (359.0)

Pcincome2 0.269 −6.147 7.644 0.243 −6.189 7.663

(4.390) (6.276) (4.726) (4.390) (6.273) (4.725)

Aged 41.01 372.30 −285.80 39.46 370.40 −285.20

(168.30) (340.70) (253.20) (168.40) (341.00) (253.20)

Kids 19.69 183.90 −78.70 18.24 182.20 −78.18

(95.21) (182.80) (134.80) (95.25) (183.00) (134.80)

P517 17.08 35.50 −7.889 18.06 36.51 −8.132

(22.63) (28.08) (33.13) (22.55) (28.01) (33.20)

Students −4,768*** −2,326*** −1,853*** −4,726*** −2,264*** −1,879***

(582.0) (531.3) (384.5) (573.7) (521.3) (383.7)

Black 9.882 5.756 0.705 9.836 5.533 0.859

(6.043) (8.284) (7.726) (6.133) (8.399) (7.738)

Hispanic 12.070 6.304 −6.943 11.870 5.612 −6.495

(10.61) (14.51) (11.41) (10.27) (13.98) (11.25)

IEP 62.00*** 27.49 29.10 61.71*** 27.06 29.28

(13.38) (25.76) (20.10) (13.39) (25.78) (20.11)

24 The University of Chicago Law Review [79:1

(1) Total

Revenue

(2) State

Revenue

(3) Local

Revenue

(4) Total

Revenue

(5) State

Revenue

(6) Local

Revenue

Observations 191,832 191,832 191,832 191,832 191,832 191,832

R-squared 0.519 0.537 0.111 0.520 0.538 0.112

Number of

Districts

13,854 13,854 13,854 13,854 13,854 13,854

Aggregate Effect of SFJ for Poor Districts 642.98*** 1,259.2** −602.36

SFJ Dummy + Poor Dummy*SFJ (228.82) (603.3) (518.82)

Notes: All models include district- and year-fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by state, are reported in

parentheses. Dependent variables are measured in constant 2007 dollars per pupil. The poor dummy

variable is an indicator for the quartile of districts with the highest proportion of students living poverty,

relative to their state and year.

* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent

2012] Making Courts Matter 25


TABLE 3. PARTISAN INTERACTIONS

(1) Total

Revenue

(2) State

Revenue

(3) Local

Revenue

(4) Total

Revenue

(5) State

Revenue

(6) Local

Revenue

Democratic SFJ 1,148** 1,756 −632.2 1,142** 1,701 −584.7

(512.5) (2,201.0) (1,597.0) (523.9) (2,203.0) (1,589.0)

Divided SFJ

−51.38 642.0 −556.1 −166.9 493.6 −510.5

(278.1) (456.8) (493.7) (286.2) (472.4) (502.3)

Republican SFJ 365.70* 99.22 218.30 215.40 −156.60 364.70

(196.4) (422.4) (564.4) (165.3) (462.4) (598.5)

Poor Dummy −183.40*** −170.30 28.45

(62.01) (104.10) (56.97)

Democratic SFJ *

Poor

26.51 225.10*** −190.70***

(73.41) (69.16) (70.37)

Divided SFJ *

Poor

497.8** 636.1** −193.4*

(193.0) (256.7) (102.8)

Republican SFJ *

Poor

622.40** 1055** −601.40***

(236.2) (400.5) (200.0)

Observations 191,832 191,832 191,832 191,832 191,832 191,832

Number of

Districts

13,854 13,854 13,854 13,854 13,854 13,854

R-squared 0.521 0.540 0.114 0.522 0.542 0.115

Aggregate Effect of SFJ for Poor Districts

Democratic SFJ + Democratic

SFJ*Poor

1,168.40** 1,926.00 −775.39

(505.90) (2,288.00) (1,684.41)

Divided SFJ + Divided SFJ*Poor 330.90 1,129.60** −703.95

(311.90) (475.84) (490.63)

Rep SFJ + Poor*Rep SFJ 837.80** 898.60** −236.74

(354.60) (448.60) (487.68)

Notes: All models include district- and year-fixed effects, as well as all of the control variables used in Table

2 (not shown). Standard errors, clustered by state, are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables are

measured in constant 2007 dollars per pupil. The Poor Dummy variable is an indicator for the quartile of

districts with the highest proportion of students living in poverty, relative to their state and year.

Democratic, Republican, and Divided SFJs are dummy variables for the partisan composition of the state

government at the time of an SFJ. The omitted category is no SFJ.

* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent

26 The University of Chicago Law Review [79:1

TABLE 3A. AUXILIARY TESTS

Coefficients Tested Total State Local Total State Local

Dem=Divided 0.0409 0.6094 0.9620 0.0294 0.5791 0.9627

Dem=Rep 0.1856 0.4857 0.6271 0.1168 0.4340 0.5871

Divided=Rep 0.2489 0.2930 0.2742 0.2725 0.2498 0.2367

Dem-p=Divided-p 0.0223 0.0916 0.9798

Dem-p=Rep-p 0.0141 0.0377 0.0512

Divided-p=Rep-p 0.6851 0.3578 0.0601

Notes: Cells report p-values from tests of the equality of the coefficients from Table 3 for different

comparisons of partisan control and district poverty.

TABLE 4. EFFECT OF SFJS BY PARTY CONTROL

AND POVERTY QUARTILE

Total Revenue State Revenue Local Revenue

Democratic SFJ 1,010** 1,616 −603.2

(458.9) (2.031) (1,490)

Divided SFJ −60.88 687.10 −565.90

−(268.6) (443.3) (497.3)

Republican SFJ 118.40 64.47 59.10

(180.4) (458.3) (567.8)

Poor (1st qrtile) −156.10*** −123.50 15.49

(53.48) (86.49) (49.29)

Upper Mid (3d qrtile) 65.60 81.54* −5.704.00

(43.03) (44.13) (36.89)

Rich (4th qrtile) 146.50* 166.80** 18.25

(84.44) (79.25) (66.14)

Dem SFJ * Poor 111.6* 267.8* −170.9

(56.33) (159.10) (129.20)

Dem SFJ * Up Mid 120.50 156.40 −64.18

(79.51) (229.60) (144.40)

Dem SFJ * Rich 311.60* 186.00 85.97

(160.9) (402.9) (262.2)

Div SFJ * Poor 414.0*** 477.5** −144.1*

(139.60) (193.50) (80.53)

Div SFJ * Up Mid −111.20 −218.10* 69.44

(88.60) (110.30) (49.01)

Total Revenue State Revenue Local Revenue

2012] Making Courts Matter 27


Div SFJ * Rich −288.40 −404.90** 39.56

(215.3) (189.9) (107.5)

Rep SFJ * Poor 719.3*** 856.3** −311.2*

(234.7) (366.9) (156.4)

Rep SFJ * Up Mid 56.30 −128.3*** 199.8**

(85.54) (43.73) (78.73)

Rep SFJ * Rich 255.8*** −513.1*** 746.4***

(82.07) (185.50) (205.30)

Observations 189,809 189,809 189,809

R-squared 0.522 0.537 0.114

Number of Districts 13,835 13,835 13,835

Notes: All models include district- and year-fixed effects, as well as all the control variables used in Table 2

(not shown). Standard errors, clustered by state, are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables are

measured in constant 2007 dollars per pupil. The poverty dummies indicate the district’s quartile in the

proportion of students living in poverty, relative to their state and year. Democratic, Republican, and

Divided SFJs are dummy variables for the partisan composition of the state government at the time of an

SFJ. The omitted category is no SFJ.

* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent

28 The University of Chicago Law Review [79:1

TABLE 4A. AUXILIARY TESTS

Coefficients Tested Total Revenue State Revenue Local Revenue

Democratic=Divided 0.0463 0.6440 0.9800

Democratic=Republican 0.0994 0.4843 0.6872

Divided=Republican 0.6067 0.2471 0.3809

Poor=UM 0.0101 0.0965 0.7458

Poor=Rich 0.0059 0.0522 0.9759

UM=Rich 0.1708 0.0626 0.5648

Democratic-poor=Democratic-UM 0.9195 0.3099 0.0933

Democratic-poor=Democratic-rich 0.2281 0.7603 0.1228

Democratic-UM=Democratic-rich 0.0448 0.8668 0.2219

Divided-poor=Divided-UM 0.0155 0.0189 0.0784

Divided-poor=Divided-Rich 0.0293 0.0155 0.2212

Divided-UM=Divided-Rich 0.2223 0.0440 0.7724

Republican-poor=Republican-UM 0.0344 0.0079 0.0000

Republican-poor=Republican-rich 0.0258 0.0064 0.0020

Republican-UM=Republican-rich 0.1347 0.0266 0.0309

Democratic-poor=Republican-poor 0.0498 0.3981 0.8604

Democratic-poor=Divided-poor 0.0123 0.1445 0.4984

Republican-poor=Divided-poor 0.2672 0.3460 0.3225

Democratic-UM=Republican-UM 0.0265 0.1266 0.3867

Democratic-UM=Divided-UM 0.5248 0.1894 0.1114

Divided-UM=Republican-UM 0.1407 0.4001 0.1277

Democratic-rich=Divided-rich 0.0134 0.1502 0.8579

Democratic-rich=Republican-rich 0.7128 0.0862 0.0386

Divided-rich=Republican-rich 0.0140 0.6596 0.0030

Notes: Cells report p-values from tests of the equality of the coefficients from Table 4 for different

comparisons of partisan control and district poverty.

2012] Making Courts Matter 29


APPENDIX TABLE 1. CASES INCLUDED IN SFJ DUMMY

State Year Case

Governor

Party

House

Party

Senate

Party

Subsequent

Reform

Cases

AL 1993 Opinion of the Justices D D D 0

CT 1996 Sheff v O’Neill R D D 1

ID 1993 Idaho Schools for Equal

Educational Opportunity v Evans

D R R 2

KS 1991 Mock v Kansas D D R 2

KY 1989 Rose v Council for Better Education D D D 0

MD 2000 Bradford v Maryland State Board of

Education

D D D 0

MA 1993 McDuffy v Secretary of Executive

Office of Education

R D D 0

MN 2000 Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP

v Minnesota

I R D 0

MO 1993 Committee for Educational Equality

v Missouri

D D D 0

MT 1990 Helena Elementary School District

No 1 v Montana, as modified

R D D 1

NH 1993 Claremont School District v

Governor

R R R 3

NJ 2000 Abbott v Burke D R R 3

NY 1995 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v New

York

R D R 1

NC 1997 Leandro v North Carolina D R D 1

OH 1997 DeRolph v Ohio, as clarified R R R 2

SC 1999 Abbeville County School District v

South Carolina

D R D 1

TN 1995 Tennessee Small School Systems v

McWherter (“Small Schools II”)

D D D 0

TX 1989 Edgewood Independent School

District v Kirby

R D D 1

VT 1997 Brigham v Vermont D D D 1

WV 1995 Tomblin v Gainer D D D 0

WY 1995 Campbell County School District v

Wyoming

R R R 1

Sources: Peterson and West, eds, School Money Trials (cited in note 13) (providing information on court

decisions); National Governors Association, Past Governors Bios, (cited in note 45) (providing information on

partisan control); US Census Bureau, The 2007 Statistical Abstract at 385–414, online at http://www.census.gov

/compendia/statab/2007/2007edition.html (visited Oct 16, 2011).