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REVIEWS
(Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics
Aziz Z. Huq
The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule. Oxford, 2010. Pp 3, 249.
INTRODUCTION
Consider a recent snapshot of our imperial presidency. It is Thursday, September 25, 2008, in the Roosevelt Room of the White House. We are at the heart of the financial meltdown.1 Not two weeks before, investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, jeopardizing hundreds of creditor counterparties, including major financial institutions. The following day, insurance giant American International Group (AIG) discloses enormous losses on credit default swaps, prompting the Federal Reserve to extend an emergency loan of $85 billion in exchange for a 79.9 percent equity stake in the company. One of the nation’s oldest money market funds, Reserve Primary Fund, experiences a run, collapsing to an unprecedented share price of less than a dollar and “breaking the buck.” It is clear the Treasury and the Federal Reserve need more funds to forestall a general liquidity crunch. In the Roosevelt Room, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson Jr and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke are addressing skeptical congressional leaders and the two presidential candidates, explaining
† Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
Thanks to Daniel Abebe, Bernard Harcourt, Rick Hills, Trevor Morrison, Eric Posner, and Adrian Vermeule for their insightful and helpful comments, and to Eileen Ho for excellent research assistance. I am especially grateful to Professor Posner for graciously suggesting that I look closely at one of his books. I am pleased to acknowledge the support of the Frank Cicero, Jr Faculty Fund. All errors herein are mine alone.
1 This account draws mainly on Simon Johnson and James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown 157–80 (Pantheon 2010); David Wessel, In Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War on the Great Panic 188–216 (Crown 2009). See also David M. Herszenhorn, Carl Hulse, and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Day of Chaos Grips Washington; Fate of Bailout Plan Unresolved, NY Times A1 (Sept 26, 2008); Matthew Karnitschnig, et al, U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, Wall St J A1 (Sept 17, 2008).
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that the “limits of the Fed’s legal authority” have been reached and that legislative action is needed to prevent “a depression greater than the Great Depression.”
2 The meeting ends in disarray, a “partisan free-for-all.”3 And as the meeting breaks up, a desperate Paulson approaches Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and—here’s the kicker—“literally bent down on one knee,” pleads for congressional action.4
It is close to a tenet of faith among constitutional scholars of diverse persuasions that ours is a republic dominated by the executive branch.5 Economies of bureaucratic scale, coupled with the executive’s primacy in responding to new security, economic, and environmental crises, are said to have frayed the Constitution’s delicate interbranch balance of powers.6 As a consequence, it is conventional wisdom that our President is now “imperial,” and Congress “broken.”7 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule—hereinafter collectively “PV”—are among the most sophisticated advocates of this dictum. But with a twist. Drawing on political science, game theory models, and the economics of agency relationships, their book The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic proposes that neither law nor legally constituted institutions (that is, Congress and courts) in practice impose meaningful constraints on the federal executive. This is so, PV say, not only in the heat of emergency but
2 Wessel, In Fed We Trust at 202 (cited in note 1).
3 Id at 215.
4 Herszenhorn, Day of Chaos, NY Times at A1 (cited in note 1).
5 For some recent examples, see Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic 141, 184–85 (Harvard 2010) (describing an “institutional presidency [ ] on the march”); Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 Minn L Rev 1789, 1810–43 (2010) (characterizing the American presidency as a “constitutional dictatorship”); William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 Yale L J 2446, 2449 (2006) (“We live in an era of increasing (and, some would say, increasingly unchecked) presidential power.”); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L J 1725, 1727 (1996) (“The dominance of executive power ought by now, to lift a phrase from Charles Black, to be a matter of common notoriety not so much for judicial notice as for background knowledge of educated people who live in this republic.”). See also John Yoo, Politics as Law? The Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 Cal L Rev 851, 874–75 (2001) (discussing “the President’s constitutional and structural superiority in conducting foreign affairs,” and the “overwhelming executive dominance in foreign affairs”).
6 See Aziz Z. Huq, Imperial March, Democracy 44, 46–53 (Winter 2008) (summarizing historical trends). For a more celebratory history of the rise of executive power, see generally Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush (Yale 2008).
7 See Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, The Imperial Presidency 377–419 (Houghton Mifflin 2004); Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track 1–13 (Oxford 2006).
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also in the ordinary run of administration (pp 4–5).
8 Succinctly put, their thesis is that “major constraints on the executive . . . do not arise from law or from the separation-of-powers framework” (p 4).9 But then, diverging from conventional narratives of executive supremacy, PV caution that the executive branch is not completely “unbound” either in ordinary times or in times of crisis.10 Echoing Madison, they locate a residual “primary controul on the government” in “the people.”11 Rather than legal rules or Congress, it is the strong undertow of democratic sentiment that tugs and binds executive discretion in practice. While The Executive Unbound is largely devoted to developing these descriptive claims with “social-scientific” precision (p 123)—a task PV pursue with verve, aplomb, and considerable force—it also gestures toward a normative claim: executive dominance within the bounds set by popular control is not merely inevitable but for the best.12
And yet . . . why then did Henry Paulson get down on one knee before Nancy Pelosi to ask for Congress to act? The timing and subject matter of the genuflection make his gesture especially puzzling. Paulson’s request concerned a highly technical matter, about which the executive had a clear institutional advantage.13 Increased sophistication in financial technologies of securitization and derivative design importantly impelled Lehman’s and then AIG’s crises.14 Few members of Congress have much inkling of “[t]he efficient market hypothesis, the capital asset pricing model, [and] the
8 “Legislators and courts [ ] are continually behind the pace of events in the administrative state; they play an essentially reactive and marginal role. . . . And in crises, the executive governs nearly alone. . . . Although we pay special attention to times of crisis, our thesis is not limited to those times” (pp 4–5).
9 Emphasis added.
10 The thesis of The Executive Unbound is also not constrained to a particular subject-matter domain, such as foreign affairs or national security law. For a crisp and effectively focused argument that trains on the former domain, see generally Daniel Abebe and Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism, 51 Va J Intl L 507 (2011).
11 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 349 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed).
12 For a normative argument by one of the authors that courts ought to show greater deference to executive rule making and adjudication in certain cases, see Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L J 1170, 1204 (2007) (arguing that the executive is best placed to resolve difficult foreign affairs questions requiring judgments of policy and principle, and that the judiciary should defer to the executive based on its foreign policy expertise).
13 Johnson and Kwak, 13 Bankers at 9 (cited in note 1).
14 This increased sophistication was also the basis for regulators’ ex ante confidence that no crisis would likely emerge. See Raghuram G. Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy 112–14 (Princeton 2010) (describing the famous “Greenspan put”).
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Black-Scholes option-pricing model.”
15 Compounding legislators’ institutional disadvantage, September 2008 was a moment of crisis. Treasury and Federal Reserve officials discerned a significant probability of catastrophic illiquidity in credit and repo markets. The need to act was believed acute. Under these tight conditions, legislators might be thought to “rationally submit[ ]” to executive demands (p 60). If ever a “blank check”16 was needed, this was surely the moment.
Of course, you know how the story ends. As recounted in The Executive Unbound, Congress did eventually relent and enact new fiscal authorities, although not without a full measure of indecorous wrangling (pp 47–48). As glossed by PV, “Congress pushed back somewhat” but was still “fundamentally driven by events and by executive proposals” (pp 50–51). The theatrics of a single Thursday, their account implies, do not provide an accurate synecdoche for the executive-legislative relationship.
But this moves too fast. For one thing, the executive, as much as Congress, was “driven by events” in the course of the financial crisis.17 For another, the claim that executive dominance characterizes interbranch relations in crisis is inconsistent with the behavior and beliefs of participants in the relevant events. Henry Merritt Paulson Jr, the six-foot-one former chief executive officer of Goldman Sachs, is hardly the sort to bow down lightly. Nor is his legalistic impulse isolated. In the midst of the summer 2011 debt ceiling showdown, President Barack Obama made a similar point:
I’m sympathetic to [the] view that this would be easier if I could do this entirely on my own. It would mean all these conversations I’ve had over the last three weeks, I could have been spending time with Malia and Sasha instead. But that’s not how our democracy works, and as I said, Americans made a decision about divided government that I wish I could undo.18
15 Justin Fox, The Myth of the Rational Market: A History of Risk, Reward, and Delusion on Wall Street 320 (HarperCollins 2009).
16 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 536 (2004) (plurality).
17 See David Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and Its (Unintended) Consequences 12–13 (Wiley & Sons 2011) (criticizing the policy responses to the financial crisis as “ad hoc”); Steven M. Davidoff and David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 Admin L Rev 463, 466 (2009) (characterizing the government’s response to the financial crisis as animated by a “dealmaking ethos”).
18 Howard Portnoy, Obama: King for a Day?, HotAir Blog (July 23, 2011), online at http://hotair.com/greenroom/archives/2011/07/23/obama-king-for-a-day/ (visited Nov 17, 2011) (describing the town hall event where Obama appeared wistful about the thought of possessing the unilateral power to raise the debt ceiling); Steve Benen, Obama Weighs in on
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A plausible political economy account of executive power, in my view, should be able to explain Paulson’s observed behavior and Obama’s expressed sentiments about “how our democracy works.” It should not write them off ab initio as either irrelevant or insincere.19
Paulson’s genuflection and Obama’s reticence, I will contend here, are symptomatic of our political system’s operation rather than being aberrational. It is generally the case that even in the heart of crisis, and even on matters where executive competence is supposedly at an acme, legislators employ formal institutional powers not only to delay executive initiatives but also affirmatively to end presidential policies.20 Numerous examples from recent events illustrate the point. Congressional adversaries of Obama, for instance, cut off his policy of emptying Guantánamo Bay via appropriations riders.21 Deficit hawks spent 2011 resisting the President’s solutions to federal debt, while the President declined to short-circuit negotiations with unilateral action.22 Even in military matters, a growing body of empirical research suggests Congress often successfully influences the course of overseas engagements to a greater degree than legal scholars have discerned or acknowledged.23
‘Constitutional Option,’ Political Animal Blog (Wash Monthly July 22, 2011), online at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-animal/2011_07/obama_weighs_in_on_constitutio 031036.php (visited Nov 17, 2011) (quoting President Obama as rejecting unilateral action to issue new debt).
19 See Part II.B (developing the argument in favor of taking such sentiments seriously at length).
20 See Part II.A (developing further examples).
21 See, for example, Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub L No 111-383 § 1032, 124 Stat 4137, 4351–53 (prohibiting the expenditure of Pentagon funds on detainee transfers). Underscoring the salience of interbranch agreement in respect to national security initiatives, Professor Jack Goldsmith argues that President Bush’s counterterrorism initiative survived to the extent they were “vetted, altered, blessed—with restrictions and accountability strings attached—by the other branches of the U.S. government.” Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency after 9/11 xii–xiii (W.W. Norton 2012). Elsewhere, Goldsmith asserts a different theory of policy continuity when he claims that “Obama stuck with the Bush policies [because] many of them were irreversibly woven into the fabric of national security architecture.” Id at 27. I concur that it is plausible to think that intragovernmental resistance, arising from agencies’ sunk costs in the development of certain policies or institutional identification with those policies, provides an alternative explanation for the persistence of policies between administrations. It is a task for future empirical and analytic work to disaggregate which of the causes Goldsmith identifies is most important.
22 See Jeffrey Sparshott, Obama Skirts Question on 14th Amendment’s Place in Debt Talks, Wash Wire Blog (Wall St J July 8, 2011), online at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire /2011/07/06/obama-skirts-question-on-14th-amendments-place-in-debt-talks/ (visited Nov 17, 2011) (quoting President Obama’s statement “I don’t think we should even get to the constitutional issue” implicated by the debt ceiling).
23 See Douglas L. Kriner, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents and the Politics of Waging War 285 (Chicago 2011) (arguing that “members of Congress have historically engaged
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That work suggests that the failure of absolute congressional control over military matters cannot be taken as evidence of “the inability of law to constrain the executive” in more subtle ways (p 5). The conventional narrative of executive dominance, in other words, is at best incomplete and demands supplementing.
This Review uses The Executive Unbound as a platform to explore how the boundaries of discretionary executive action are established. As the controversial national security policies of the Bush administration recede in time, the issue of executive power becomes ripe for reconsideration. Arguments for or against binding the executive are starting to lose their partisan coloration. There is more room to investigate the dynamics of executive power in a purely positive fashion without the impinging taint of ideological coloration.
Notwithstanding this emerging space for analysis, there is still surprising inattention to evidence of whether the executive is constrained and to the positive question of how constraint works. The Executive Unbound is a significant advance because it takes seriously this second “mechanism question.” Future studies of the executive branch will ignore its important and trenchant analysis at their peril.24 Following PV’s lead, I focus on the descriptive, positive question of how the executive is constrained. I do speak briefly and in concluding to normative matters. But first and foremost, my arguments should be understood as positive and not normative in nature unless otherwise noted.
Articulating and answering the question “What binds the executive?”, The Executive Unbound draws a sharp line between legal and political constraints on discretion—a distinction between laws and institutions on the one hand, and the incentives created by political competition on the other hand. While legal constraints usually fail, it argues, political constraints can prevail. PV thus postulate what I call a “strong law/politics dichotomy.” My central claim in this Review is that this strong law/politics dichotomy cannot withstand scrutiny. While doctrinal scholars exaggerate law’s autonomy, I contend, the realists PV underestimate the extent to which legal rules and institutions play a pivotal role in the production
in a variety of actions from formal initiatives, such as introducing legislation or holding hearings that challenge the President’s conduct of military action, to informal efforts to shape the nature of the policy debate [on wars]”); William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force, 59 Intl Org 209, 228–29 (2005).
24 This Review does not catalog all of the many ways in which The Executive Unbound makes contributions to the study of the executive branch because it aims to build upon and extend that analysis.
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of executive constraint. Further, the political mechanisms they identify as substitutes for legal checks cannot alone do the work of regulating executive discretion. Diverging from both legalist and realist positions, I suggest that law and politics do not operate as substitutes in the regulation of executive authority.
25 They instead work as interlocking complements. An account of the borders of executive discretion must focus on the interaction of partisan and electoral forces on the one hand and legal rules. It must specify the conditions under which the interaction of political actors’ exertions and legal rules will prove effective in limiting such discretion.
Without embarking on the ambitious task of supplying a general theory of such interactions, I will suggest that an accurate political economy of executive restraint must identify a range of mechanisms in which both legal and political elements play roles. The primary aim of this Review is to clear ground for this account by rejecting “law only” and “politics only” explanations in favor of models with space for the interlocking operation of law and politics. To that end, I develop several examples that are suggestive of the potentially complementary operation of legal and political forces. I make no claim that these examples are exhaustive. To the contrary, I suspect that the dynamic interaction of legal rules and political forces takes many different forms depending on the background legal infrastructure and contingent features of the political environment. No brief catalog could capture their heterogeneity.
The caveats and modifications I offer to PV’s descriptive claims about the efficacy of law and politics may additionally have implications for a normative evaluation of executive dominance. If the latter is neither politically inevitable nor precisely calibrated, it cannot be assumed that executive policy choices are always for the best. I also point to recent changes in national politics that may be increasingly undermining the possibility of coproduced legal-political constraints. My positive account of executive constraint hence suggests that the executive may be, as PV’s title suggests, “unbounded,” but not for the reasons that many believe and not in ways that conduce to socially desirable outcomes. This, I conclude, should foster pessimism about the future trajectory of executive-led governance.
The Review proceeds in four parts. Part I sketches PV’s central theme—the strong law/politics dichotomy. Part II challenges PV’s
25 Posner and Vermeule argue similarly in The Executive Unbound that “de facto political constraints [ ] have grown up and, to some degree, substituted for legal constraints on the executive” (p 5) (emphasis added).
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claim that law is irrelevant to limiting executive discretion. Part III then closely parses their account of strong political constraints. My aim in both Part II and Part III is not to carp about PV’s basic rational choice methodology, even though it is not universally shared but often contested. Rather, I aim to develop reasons within that framework for questioning some of their conclusions. Turning from the critical to the constructive, Part IV proposes that rather than acting as substitutes, politics and law may work as complements to coproduce limits on executive actions, although such coordination may be increasingly rare and fragile.
I. THE NEW CRITS
A neophyte consumer of legal scholarship might be forgiven for thinking that one of the terms of admission to law’s ivory tower is a public affirmation that law on its own matters. Yet there is a long line of thinkers, going back to the Legal Realists at the turn of the twentieth century, who “sought to weaken, if not dissolve, the law-politics dichotomy”26 and to infuse legal analysis with social-scientific method.27 In the late 1970s, the Critical Legal Studies movement set itself the task of unpacking the “contradictions” of “mainstream liberal thought” in ways that sapped the formal robustness of legal categories.28 More recently, empirical scholars have aimed to “produc[e] a New Legal Realism—an effort to understand the sources of judicial decisions on the basis of testable hypotheses and large data sets.”29
The Executive Unbound stands squarely in this plural tradition.30 Although it briefly nods to empirical legal studies, it is also usefully read as a descendant of Critical Legal Studies, albeit one that advances a quite different and distinct political and institutional program. Tracking the so-called Crit methodology, PV “refuse to
26 William M. Wiecek, Liberty under Law: The Supreme Court in American Life 187 (Johns Hopkins 1988). See also Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 Tex L Rev 731, 734 (2009) (arguing that skepticism about the rule-bound nature of judging predated the Legal Realists by three decades).
27 See Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927–1960 97 (North Carolina 1986) (“[T]he overriding concern of the average realist was to make the study of law more ‘realistic.’”).
28 Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 3 (Harvard 1987). See also Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement 8–11 (Harvard 1986) (identifying a “critique of formalism” as a central plank of the Critical Legal Studies agenda).
29 Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U Chi L Rev 831, 831 (2008).
30 See Harvey Mansfield, Book Review, The Inevitable Imperial President, NY Times BR12 (Mar 13, 2011) (“Posner and Vermeule belong to the school of legal realism.”).
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accept the ordinary distinction between epiphenomenal law and ‘real’ society.”
31 They also share a goal with Critical Legal Studies: “[T]o identify the crucial structural characteristics of mainstream legal thought as examples of something called ‘liberalism.’”32
Echoing Crit themes, The Executive Unbound mounts a sustained assault on dominant pieties of legal scholarship—the autonomy and relevance of legal and constitutional rules.33 Its central target is “liberal legalism.” This is defined as the view that “representative legislatures govern and should govern . . . [and] that law does and should constrain the executive” (p 3). Liberal legalists, in PV’s telling, emphasize two ways in which law limits executive power. First, law binds via the separation of powers—that is, by fashioning Congress and the courts as institutional counterweights to the executive. Second, it works through framework statutes and by specifying absolute limits in the form of enacted statutes. What the legalist focus on institutions and legal rules fails to discern, PV contend, is that both such mechanisms are ineffectual on the ground (p 7).34 By contrast, it is political mechanisms that do the real work in imposing limits on what the executive can do. Fleshing out the idea of a political mechanism, PV identify a “reelection constraint” on Presidents operating “in a polity dominated by a mass public accustomed to exercising a large degree of democratic control” (p 12).35 This in turn fosters in the White House a need to sustain “popularity and credibility” (p 13). In consequence, opponents of political liberalism such as Weimar- and Nazi-era legal theorist Carl Schmitt exaggerate in their criticism of democratic rule and their advocacy of “decisionism” the claim that power rests in the entity with authority to determine when rules apply or not (pp 32–34, 90–91).36
31 Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies at 253 (cited in note 28). The Crits, though, are distinctive in their emphasis on the necessary internal contradictions hidden within legal rules, reflecting the pervasiveness of social conflict. See id at 258–62. The Crits were also much more skeptical of social science results than Professors Posner and Vermeule. See id at 167–71.
32 Id at 2.
33 For an extended critique of the dominant mode of liberal legalism in the international context, see Eric A. Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism xii (Chicago 2009) (criticizing legalism as a “view that loses sight of the social function of law and sees it as an end in itself”).
34 “[O]ur main critical thesis is that liberal legalism has proven unable to generate meaningful constraints on the executive” (p 7).
35 In my reconstruction of PV’s account, I take a broader view of the political. See text accompanying note 216.
36 PV have elsewhere recoded much of Schmitt’s argument (stripped of its Catholic theological apparatus) as mid-level institutional insights of a kind that are familiar from political and economic analysis. See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Demystifying Schmitt *1–2 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No 10-47, Jan 26, 2011), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1723191 (visited Nov 17, 2011).
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Before fleshing out the strong law/politics dichotomy further, it is worth explaining briefly how PV prioritize the two strands of their argument. PV present their argument as the equal pursuit of “two main claims”—the fragility of law and the force of politics—and state at the threshold that their six-chapter book will be evenly split between the two theses (p 15). They indeed devote their first three chapters to the negative task of critiquing liberal legalism. But their fifth chapter then concerns the futility of (international) law as a constraint on executive action (pp 156–57).
37 And their final chapter attacks attitudes of suspicion toward the executive, which they call “tyrannophobia,” in order to demonstrate “a central fallacy of liberal legalism: the assumption that the only possible constraints on the executive are de jure constraints” (p 204). In all, five of their six chapters comprise attacks upon liberal liberalism. Only the fourth chapter discusses political constraints (pp 113–14). Viewed as a whole therefore, The Executive Unbound is principally a requiem for legal liberalism, not an ode to robust politics.
Consider first the case PV make against law and legal institutions as bulwarks against the executive. Their central argument rests on a logic of comparative institutional competence. Congress and judges alike, they argue, lack incentives or ability to gather and process information necessary to act quickly or to engage in oversight. Courts suffer from a “legitimacy deficit,” which dampens judicial willingness to intervene (pp 30–31, 57–58). And the separation of powers system can be gamed by an executive using a strategy of “divide and conquer” against the two other branches (pp 19–31).38 The net result is that Congress fails to anticipate crises and then is forced to delegate broad new powers after the fact (pp 43–52), while courts lag far behind executive initiatives.
PV also challenge the notion that framework statutes constrain the executive. Courts exercise a power of review pursuant to general framework statutes such as the Administrative Procedure Act.39 But,
37 This kind of argument has received extensive attention elsewhere. See, for example, Oona A. Hathaway and Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Book Review, Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law, 119 Harv L Rev 1404, 1420–26 (2006), reviewing Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford 2005).
38 See also pp 118–22 (summarizing studies that show separated powers do not yield optimal economic policies).
39 Pub L No 79-404, 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5. For a specific provision of the Administrative Procedure Act that authorizes judicial review of decisions by executive agencies, see 5 USC § 702.
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PV contend, such review has little influence on outcomes (pp 35–37).
40 PV identify a series of exceptions and tractable standards in the doctrinal and statutory structure of administrative law that make law so malleable as to impose no effective resistance to executive action (pp 89–103). PV see law’s plasticity as an “inevitable . . . matter of institutional capacities” (p 105).41 Further, they predict that courts will anticipate the superior ability of the executive to deal with complex technological and economic problems and fall into line (p 31).42 Similarly, a “reluctant” Congress will find legal plasticity “inescapable” (p 108).
Does anything limit the presidency? PV readily concede that the President is not “all-powerful” and the White House “does face some checks even from a generally supine Congress” (p 61). They also recognize “a handful of great [Supreme Court] cases in which judges have checked or constrained discretionary executive action” but style these as the exception, rather than the rule (pp 30–31). And they warn that “the president can exert control only in certain areas” (p 59). They do not, though, closely examine any specific judicial or legislative action to identify the operative mechanisms of constraint. And PV’s concessions on these issues play no large role in their descriptive account. They thus make no claim that law has any systematic function in the political economy of executive constraint. Notwithstanding fleeting caveats, therefore, a fair-minded reader of The Executive Unbound likely finishes the book with the impression that PV are highly skeptical that law plays any meaningful or substantial role in checking the executive.
Instead, PV claim, the main reason Presidents are not “all-powerful” is political checks (p 61).43 PV’s account of political checks is grounded in a view of the President as an agent of the public.44 In this principal-agent model, the public (which is the principal) has imperfect information as to whether the President (the agent) is “well-motivated” in the sense of “choos[ing] the policies that voters
40 For example, PV review evidence of judicial responses to post-9/11 security measures and find that judicial orders account for less than 4 percent of Guantánamo detainee releases (p 36).
41 Emphasis added. The claim is developed at greater length in Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 Harv L Rev 1095, 1096–98, 1132–36 (2009).
42 “Legislators and judges understand that the executive’s comparative institutional advantages in secrecy, force, and unity are all the more useful during emergencies . . . .” (p 31).
43 PV claim that “Congress’s main weapon for affecting presidential behavior is not the cumbersome and costly legal mechanism of legislation. Rather legislators appeal to the court of public opinion, which in turn constrains the president” (p 61).
44 The theory was initially set forth in Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U Chi L Rev 865, 874–83 (2007).
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would choose if they knew what the executive knows” (p 130). The public will therefore deny the President rewards such as reelection unless it receives a credible signal that the President is “well-motivated.” Hence, Presidents need to build their “credibility” with the public by demonstrating good motives. The search for credibility induces limits on executive behavior (pp 122–24, 129–33). To maintain credibility, a well-motivated executive cannot rely on demonstrating good outcomes, for there is an imperfect correlation between policy choices and outcomes. Instead, the well-motivated executive must take actions that would be unfeasibly costly if it had undesirable motives (p 123). For example, a well-motivated exe-cutive will share power with political adversaries and disclose information to demonstrate its bona fides,
45 while an ill-motivated executive would find these actions too costly. Paradoxically then, it is the very breadth of presidential discretion that induces a need to sustain popular trust, which in turn leads to actions that limit the exercise of executive power (pp 150–53).46
Credibility is the main mechanism of political control analyzed in The Executive Unbound. But PV hint at others. They point briefly to “a wealthy and highly educated population, whose elites continually scrutinize executive action and tighten the constraints of popularity and credibility” (p 14). Publicity is said to work through a “complex process by which the views of elites, interest groups, ordinary citizens, and others ultimately determine the de facto lines of political authority” (p 78).47 To be sure, elections rely on informed voters (who may not always be available) and can be used only periodically (pp 114–16). And since the enactment of the Twenty-Second Amendment in 1947,48 second-term Presidents have not faced reelection. Nevertheless, PV propose, even second-term Presidents worry about their “policy legacy and their place in history” (p 13). As a consequence, there is a public-regarding friction on even final-period Presidents’ decisions.
45 Possible signals include using the establishment of independent agencies or commissions, bipartisan appointments, actions that cut against partisan priors (the “Nixon goes to China” strategy), information disclosure, multilateral endorsements of contentious foreign military actions, strict liability for damages from executive policies, and “precommitting” to results through statutes (pp 141–50).
46 See also p 13.
47 For a more parsimonious and hence more generalizable account of the inevitable “political and psychological” power of simple majorities, see Adrian Vermeule, The Force of Majority Rule *26–27 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No 08-48, Oct 27, 2008), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1280201 (visited Nov 17, 2011).
48 US Const Amend XXII.
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To summarize, the strong law/politics dichotomy at the heart of The Executive Unbound rests on twin claims of law’s fragility and the effective force of politics. Rejecting traditional legal scholarship’s narrow focus on doctrine, PV’s theory predicts that Presidents can and do act forcefully except to the extent they perceive a credibility or publicity benefit from holding back.
49 Congress, the courts, and ex ante legal constraints, by contrast, are epiphenomenal and play little or no role. The account also has a normative sheen. By implication, executive dominance is not merely inevitable but to be welcomed given the presidency’s comparative advantage in policy making and in credibility-induced fidelity to democratic wishes.
II. THE SURPRISING RESILIENCE OF LAW
The Executive Unbound exposes canonical pieties about the efficacy of constitutional rules and statutory limits to corrosive scrutiny. Its account of law and legal institutions as weak forces, however, leaves no room for Paulson’s genuflection, Obama’s resistance to unilateral resolution of the debt crisis, or the current impasse over Guantánamo. In each of these cases, the logic of comparative institutional advantage points toward strong, even unilateral executive action. In each case, the executive arguably gains little credibility from seeking another branch’s consent. yet in each case, the executive has in fact held back from action ex proprio vigore. And in each case, officials do so apparently on the basis of sincere beliefs about the effective force of law.
This Part develops a case for taking law and institutions more seriously. Specifically, I examine three strands that run through The Executive Unbound’s skepticism toward law to probe their limits. First, PV portray law as historically and presently ineffective. With only minor caveats, they showcase an executive almost never inhibited by ex ante legal rules. Second, PV depict law as lacking the ability to motivate political actors. The fact that one option is legal and another is not therefore is never counted as a reason for picking the first option. Finally, PV contend there is no theoretical account in liberal political thought that explains the efficacy of legal and institutional chains. Law on this account fails not just in practice and in the minds of political actors, but also on the pages of the theorists.
49 Hence, PV argued during the debt ceiling crisis that President Obama should act unilaterally not only because a failure to do so would be “catastrophic” but because he would have had broad political support. See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Obama Should Raise the Debt Ceiling on His Own, NY Times (July 22, 2011), online at http://www.nytimes.com /2011/07/22/opinion/22posner.html (visited Nov 17, 2011).
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This Part lodges exceptions to each of these strands. I begin by highlighting evidence from the presidential studies and legal scholarship that the President is often constrained by other branches and by at least certain laws. Second, I explore evidence of political actors’ normative preferences respecting legality and constitutionality. Finally, I highlight resources in liberal political theory that help explain why legal and institutional constraints are effective. History, theory, and political psychology, I aim to show, provide toeholds for the law by showing how political actors have both normative and instrumental reasons for complying with the law.
I should be clear that my goal here is not to suggest that PV’s skepticism about legal constraints is categorically unwarranted. Concern that Presidents can on occasion play fast and loose with the law is unquestionably grounded in fact. It does not follow from my analysis that law is always, necessarily, or automatically effective—PV persuasively show it is often not for reasons sketched in Part I. My point is rather that law cannot be dismissed so quickly and that PV’s treatment of law as functionally marginal understates its actual salience.50 At least in some nontrivial set of conditions, law is relevant to the imposition of an effective constraint on the executive. It therefore must be awarded a substantial role in any general political economy of the executive branch.
A. Historical Evidence of Executive Constraint via Law
The Executive Unbound paints an image of executive discretion almost or completely unbridled by law or coequal branch. But PV also concede that “the president can exert control only in certain [policy] areas” (p 59).51 They give no account, however, of what limits a President’s discretionary actions. To remedy that gap, this Section explores how the President has been and continues to be hemmed in by Congress and law. My aim here is not to present a comprehensive account of law as a constraining mechanism. Nor is my claim that law is always effective. Both as a practical matter and as a result of administrative law doctrine, the executive has considerable authority to leverage ambiguities in statutory text into warrants for discretionary action.52 Rather, my more limited aspiration here is to
50 See text accompanying note 43 (describing PV’s caveats).
51 See also Posner and Vermeule, 74 U Chi L Rev at 889 (cited in note 44) (“We neither make, nor need to make, any general empirical claim that Congress has no control over executive discretion.”).
52 See pp 94–109 (identifying mechanisms for generating discretion in the face of legal constraint and contending that legislators and judges allow such discretion for “quite practical
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show that Congress and law do play a meaningful role in cabining executive discretion than The Executive Unbound credits. I start with Congress and then turn to the effect of statutory restrictions on the presidency.
Consider first a simple measure of Presidents’ ability to obtain policy change: Do they obtain the policy changes they desire? Every President enters office with an agenda they wish to accomplish.53 President Obama came into office, for example, promising health care reform, a cap-and-trade solution to climate change, and major immigration reform.54 President George W. Bush came to the White House committed to educational reform, social security reform, and a new approach to energy issues.55 One way of assessing presidential influence is by examining how such presidential agendas fare, and asking whether congressional obstruction or legal impediments—which could take the form of existing laws that preclude an executive policy change or an absence of statutory authority for desired executive action—is correlated with presidential failure. Such a correlation would be prima facie evidence that institutions and laws play some meaningful role in the production of constraints on executive discretion.
Both recent experience and long-term historical data suggest presidential agenda items are rarely achieved, and that legal or institutional impediments to White House aspirations are part of the reason. In both the last two presidencies, the White House obtained at least one item on its agenda—education for Bush and health care for Obama—but failed to secure others in Congress. Such limited success is not new. His famous first hundred days notwithstanding, Franklin Delano Roosevelt saw many of his “proposals for reconstruction [of government] . . . rejected outright.”56 Even in the midst of economic crisis, Congress successfully resisted New Deal initiatives from the White House. This historical evidence suggests that the diminished success of presidential agendas cannot be
reasons”); Ackerman, Decline and Fall 87–89 (cited in note 5) (arguing that the executive has developed new institutional tools to “give [a] constitutional imprimatur to presidential power grabs”).
53 See Paul C. Light, The President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton 2–3 (Johns Hopkins 3d ed 1999) (defining the agenda as a signal that “indicates what the President believes to be the most important issues facing his administration”).
54 Matt Welch and Nick Gillespie, What’s Next, Mr. President—Cardigans?, Wash Post B9 (July 19, 2009).
55 Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha and Tom Miles, George W. Bush’s Domestic Policy Agenda, 29 Am Rev Pol 351, 356–57 (2008).
56 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton 32 (Belknap rev ed 1997).
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ascribed solely to the narrowing scope of congressional attention in recent decades; it is an older phenomenon. Nevertheless, in more recent periods, presidential agendas have shrunk even more. President George W. Bush’s legislative agenda was “half as large as Richard Nixon’s first-term agenda in 1969–72, a third smaller than Ronald Reagan’s first-term agenda in 1981–84, and a quarter smaller than his father’s first-term agenda in 1989–92.”
57 The White House not only cannot always get what it wants from Congress but has substantially downsized its policy ambitions.
Supplementing this evidence of presidential weakness are studies of the determinants of White House success on Capitol Hill. These find that “presidency-centered explanations” do little work.58 Presidents’ legislative agendas succeed not because of the intrinsic institutional characteristics of the executive branch, but rather as a consequence of favorable political conditions within the momentarily dominant legislative coalition.59 Again, correlational evidence suggests that institutions and the legal frameworks making up the statutory status quo ante play a role in delimiting executive discretion.
But attention to the White House’s legislative agenda may be misleading. Perhaps the dwindling of legislative agendas is offset by newly minted technologies of direct “presidential administration.”60 The original advocate of this governance strategy has conceded, however, that presidential administration is available only when “Congress has left [ ] power in presidential hands.”61 Where there is no plausible statutory or constitutional foundation for a White House agenda-item, or where there is a perceived need for additional congressional action in the form of new appropriations or the like, Presidents cannot act alone.
The notion of a legislatively constrained presidential agenda is consistent with two canonical political science accounts of the contemporary presidency. Richard Neustadt, perhaps the most influential presidential scholar of the twentieth century,
57 Paul C. Light, Fact Sheet on the President’s Domestic Agenda *2 (Brookings Institute Oct 12, 2004), online at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2004/1012governance_light.aspx (visited Nov 17, 2011).
58 See Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena x (Chicago 1990).
59 See id at 117 (concluding that it is “the distribution of partisan and ideological forces [among Congressmen that] sets the basic parameters of presidential success or failure in Congress”). This evidence reinforces the inference that it is not merely the shrinking of congressional agendas that drives a smaller presidential agenda.
60 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv L Rev 2245, 2282–90 (2001).
61 Id at 2251.
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encapsulated the Constitution’s system as one of “separated institutions sharing powers” in which “a President will often be unable to obtain congressional action on his terms or even . . . halt action he opposes.”
62 Writing in 1990, Neustadt concluded that the President “still shares most of his authority with others and is no more free than formerly to rule by command.”63 Neustadt’s finding of a weak presidency rested in part on his discernment of political constraints. But he also stressed “Congress and its key committees” as necessary partners in the production of policy.64 Neustadt thus identified institutions, as much as public opinion, as impediments to the White House.
In harmony with Neustadt’s view, Stephen Skowronek’s magisterial survey of presidential leadership suggests Presidents are not free to ignore or sideline Congress. Skowronek points out that “[i]t is not just that the presidency has gradually become more powerful and independent over the course of American history, but that the institutions and interests surrounding it have as well.”65 His complex argument (much simplified) situates presidential authority within a cyclical pattern of political “regime” creation, maintenance, and disintegration.66 In this cycle, the presidency is primarily a destructive force. Chief executives affiliated with past regimes have fewer tools at their disposal than oppositional leaders who “come[] to power with a measure of independence from established commitments and can more easily justify the disruptions that attend the exercise of power.”67 Executive discretion, in this account, is a function of a President’s location in the cycle of historical change. It is not a necessary attribute of the institution.
Skowronek also argues that Congress maintains and enforces prior regimes’ policy commitments against presidential innovation. He finds congressional abdication to be “virtually unknown to the modern presidency.”68 To the contrary, Skowronek contends, Congress has become more effective over time. Thomas Jefferson in the early 1800s, working with an “organizationally inchoate and politically malleable” legislature, had greater discretion than Ronald
62 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan 29, 32 (Free Press rev ed 1990) (emphasis omitted).
63 Id at 199 (emphasis added).
64 See id at 197, 199.
65 Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make at 31 (cited in note 56).
66 See id at 34–52.
67 Id at 35.
68 Id at 418.
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Reagan in the 1980s.
69 By President Reagan’s time in office, the “governmental norms and institutional modalities” used to resist presidential initiatives had secured sufficient political capital to become resilient to presidential efforts at change.70 Until then, political movements proposing greater presidential authority also tended to advocate “some new mechanisms designed to hold [presidential] powers to account.”71 Skowronek provides a useful corrective to the assumption that historical change occurs only at one end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Echoing Neustadt’s analysis, his bottom line is that the contemporary executive remains “constrained by Congress”72 in ways that meaningfully hinder achievement of presidential goals.73
Nevertheless, neither Neustadt nor Skowronek articulate the precise role of law in congressional obstruction of presidential goals. Perhaps observed executive reticence is merely a result of political calculations, consistent with PV’s core hypothesis. But the evidence that the limits on executive authority tend to arise when Congress or existing law preclude a discretionary act suggests that institutions and statutes do play a meaningful role. Such correlations do not, however, establish the precise mechanisms whereby laws and institutions impose frictions on the employment of executive discretion.
Alternatively, perhaps the Neustadt and Skowronek accounts can be explained solely in terms of Congress’s negative veto in bicameralism and presentment, which is anticipated by the White House and so delimits the scope of presidential agendas. This would suggest that Congress’s power is asymmetrical: it can block some
69 See Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make at 418 (cited in note 56).
70 See id. See also Keith E. Whittington and Daniel P. Carpenter, Executive Power in American Institutional Development, 1 Persp Polit 495, 508 (2003) (“In response [to unilateral executive action], Congress has fundamentally restructured itself in ways that would not have occurred in the absence of a more powerful executive branch.”).
71 Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 Harv L Rev 2070, 2079 (2009). See also Kagan, 114 Harv L Rev at 2251, 2320 (cited in note 60) (emphasizing also the continuing possibility of congressional controls).
72 Whittington and Carpenter, 1 Persp Polit at 508 (cited in note 70) (describing, for example, how Congress has “developed entirely new institutions to challenge presidential budgetary decisions”).
73 Hence, in other work, Skowronek and Karen Orren explain how Congress in the early 1970s rewrote federal forest management law in order to restrict President Nixon’s ability to use the impoundment power or the new Office of Management and Budget for deregulatory ends, and “to promote Congress as the final arbiter of agency priorities.” See Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development 168–69 (Cambridge 2004).
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executive initiatives but do little midstream to regulate the use of discretion powers already possessed by the presidency. Consistent with this interpretation, The Executive Unbound stresses the failure of framework laws passed after the Nixon presidency to regulate war and emergency powers (pp 86–87).
74 If the executive can so easily find work-arounds, PV explain, it follows that Congress also has less incentive to pass such laws. In the long term, the incentives for Congress to enact statutory limits on presidential authorities will accordingly atrophy.
There is some merit to this story. But in my view it again understates the observed effect of positive legal constraints on executive discretion. Recent scholarship, for example, has documented congressional influence on the shape of military policy via framework statutes. This work suggests Congress influences executive actions during military engagements through hearings and legislative proposals.75 Consistent with this account, two legal scholars have recently offered a revisionist history of constitutional war powers in which “Congress has been an active participant in setting the terms of battle,” in part because “congressional willingness to enact [ ] laws has only increased” over time.76 In the last decade, Congress has often taken the initiative on national security, such as enacting new statutes on military commissions in 2006 and 2009.77 Other recent landmark security reforms, such as a 2004
74 PV list the War Powers Resolution, the National Emergencies Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the Inspector General Act as examples. Their analysis of security-related statutes, however, is incomplete. At least until 2001, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub L No 95-511, 92 Stat 1783, codified at 50 USC § 1801 et seq, proved effective in regulating federal electronic surveillance outside the criminal investigation context. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Pub L No 89-487, 80 Stat 250 (1966), codified as amended at 5 USC § 552, which established an enforceable right of access to executive branch information, also likely influenced government behavior. FOIA litigation resulted in disclosures of significant documentary evidence of torture and abusive treatment of detainees. While both FISA and FOIA have their limits, and have been violated, neither is a wholesale failure.
75 See note 23. Some of the best-known examples concern American funding for the Nicaraguan Contras. See, for example, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985 § 8066(a), Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1837, 1935 (prohibiting expenditure of funds on aid to Nicaraguan Contras); Joint Resolution of Oct 3, 1984 § 106(c), Pub L No 98-441, 98 Stat 1699, 1700–01; Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 § 108, Pub L No 98-215, 97 Stat 1473, 1475; Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1983 § 793, Pub L No 97-377, 96 Stat 1833, 1865.
76 David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 Harv L Rev 941, 947 (2008) (emphasis added).
77 See Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA), Pub L No 111-84, title XVIII, 123 Stat 2574, codified at 10 USC § 948 et seq; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub L No 109-366, 120 Stat 2600, 2602–03, codified as amended at 10 USC § 948a et seq.
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statute restructuring the intelligence community,
78 also had only lukewarm Oval Office support.79 Measured against a baseline of threshold executive preferences then, Congress has achieved nontrivial successes in shaping national security policy and institutions through both legislated and nonlegislated actions even in the teeth of White House opposition.80
The same point emerges more forcefully from a review of our “fiscal constitution.”81 Article I, § 8 of the Constitution vests Congress with power to “lay and collect Taxes” and to “borrow Money on the credit of the United States,” while Article I, § 9 bars federal funds from being spent except “in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”82 Congress has enacted several framework statutes to effectuate the “powerful limitations” implicit in these clauses.83 The resulting law prevents the President from repudiating past policy commitments (as Skowronek suggests) as well as imposing barriers to novel executive initiatives that want for statutory authorization.84
Three statutes merit attention here. First, the Miscellaneous Receipts Act of 184985 requires that all funds “received from customs, from the sales of public lands, and from all miscellaneous sources, for the use of the United States, shall be paid . . . into the treasury of the
78 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub L No 108-458, 118 Stat 3638.
79 See Michael Warner, Legal Echoes: The National Security Act of 1947 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 17 Stan L & Pol Rev 303, 310 (2006) (“It is true that President Bush himself was not the engine of intelligence reform, but it is also likely that without his efforts on its behalf, the Intelligence Reform Act would never have reached a vote in Congress.”).
80 The same has been said of federal responses to the 2008 financial crisis. See Davidoff and Zaring, 61 Admin L Rev at 465 (cited in note 17) (“Although the government never . . . acted as if it felt very constrained by the law that limited its actions, we think that its legal constraints help to explain a great deal of the government response.”).
81 Kenneth W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U Chi L Rev 271, 271–72 (1977).
82 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1, 2; US Const Art I, § 9, cl 7.
83 Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L J 1343, 1345 (1988).
84 Congress’s power of the purse is not a perfect mechanism of control. To control agency slack, Congress may have to choose between either overfunding an agency and allowing some waste, or underfunding an agency at the cost of not achieving policy goals entirely. See Michael M. Ting, The “Power of the Purse” and Its Implications of Bureaucratic Policy-Making, 106 Pub Choice 243, 264–65 (2001) (describing the “double-edged sword” of fiscal control). See also Christopher R. Berry, Barry C. Burden, and William G. Howell, The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending, 104 Am Polit Sci Rev 783, 786–87 (2010) (finding evidence that suggests the White House, through the Office of Management and Budget, exercises considerable post-legislative control of fiscal flows).
85 Act of Mar 3, 1849, 9 Stat 398, codified as amended at 31 USC § 3302(b).
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United States.”
86 It ensures that the executive cannot establish off-balance-sheet revenue streams as a basis for independent policy making. Second, the Anti-Deficiency Act,87 which was first enacted in 1870 and then amended in 1906,88 had the effect of cementing the principle of congressional appropriations control.89 With civil and criminal sanctions, it prohibits “unfunded monetary liabilities beyond the amounts Congress has appropriated,” and bars “the borrowing of funds by federal agencies . . . in anticipation of future appropriations.”90 Finally, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 197491 (Impoundment Act) channels presidential authority to decline to expend appropriated funds.92 It responded to President Nixon’s expansive use of impoundment.93 Congress had no trouble rejecting Nixon’s claims despite a long history of such impoundments.94 While the Miscellaneous Receipts Act and the Anti-Deficiency Act appear to have succeeded, the Impoundment Act has a more mixed record. While the Supreme Court endorsed legislative constraints on presidential impoundment,95 President Gerald Ford increased impoundments through creative interpretations of the law.96 But two decades later, Congress concluded the executive had too little discretionary spending authority and expanded it by statute.97
86 Act of Mar 3, 1849 § 1, 9 Stat at 398. The act is subject to a number of exceptions, none of which are relevant here. See Stith, 97 Yale L J at 1365–70 (cited in note 83).
87 Act of July 12, 1870, 16 Stat 230, codified as amended in various sections of Title 31.
88 Act of Feb 27, 1906 § 3, 34 Stat 49.
89 See Act of July 12, 1870 § 7, 16 Stat at 251 (providing that no governmental department shall expend in one year more than the appropriations made by Congress for that year).
90 Stith, 97 Yale L J at 1371 (cited in note 83) (stating that the Anti-Deficiency Act prevents unauthorized prior executive obligations from undermining Congress’s power of the purse).
91 Pub L No 93-344, 88 Stat 297, codified as amended 2 USC §§ 681–92.
92 Impoundment Act §§ 1001–17, 88 Stat at 332–39. This Act “began the use of statutory framework laws in this area, including establishing the concurrent budget resolution, setting the stage for the reconciliation process, and ultimately providing points of order and other internal enforcement provisions to increase congressional authority over the federal purse.” Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J Contemp Legal Issues 717, 723 (2005).
93 See Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power 158–59 (Princeton 1975) (describing President Nixon’s claims to an impoundment power); id at 176 (“The Nixon impoundments were unprecedented in their scope and severity.”).
94 Whittington and Carpenter, 1 Persp Polit at 507 (cited in note 70).
95 See Train v City of New York, 420 US 35, 41 (1975) (finding no presidential authority to withhold funds under the Clean Water Act).
96 Fisher, Presidential Spending Power at 200 (cited in note 93).
97 See Line Item Veto Act, Pub L No 104-130, 110 Stat 1200 (1996), codified at 2 USC §§ 691–92, abrogated in Clinton v New York, 524 US 417 (1998).
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Moreover, statutory regulation of the purse furnishes a tool for judicial influence over the executive. Judicial action in turn magnifies congressional influence. A recent study of taxation litigation finds evidence that the federal courts interpret fiscal laws in a more pro-government fashion during military engagements supported by both Congress and the White House than in the course of unilateral executive military entanglements.
98 Although the resulting effect is hard to quantify, the basic finding of the study suggests that fiscal statutes trench on executive discretion not only directly, but also indirectly via judicially created incentives to act only with legislative endorsement.99
To be sure, a persistent difficulty in debates about congressional efficacy, and with some of the claims advanced in The Executive Unbound, is that it is unclear what baseline should be used to evaluate the outcomes of executive-congressional struggles. What counts, that is, as a “win” and for whom? What, for example, is an appropriate level of legislative control over expenditures? In the examples developed in this Part, I have underscored instances in which a law has been passed that a President disagrees with in substantial part, and where there are divergent legislative preferences reflected in the ultimate enactment. I do not mean to suggest, however, that there are not alternative ways of delineating a baseline for analysis.100
In sum, there is strong evidence that law and lawmaking institutions have played a more robust role in delimiting the bounds of executive discretion over the federal sword and the federal purse than The Executive Unbound intimates. Congress in fact impedes presidential agendas. The White House in practice cannot use
98 Nancy Staudt, The Judicial Power of the Purse: How Courts Fund National Defense in Times of Crisis 77–86, 106–07 (Chicago 2011) (finding that the Supreme Court decided taxation cases “in a manner that strongly supported the elected branches of government, thereby increasing the size of the fiscal pie” during World War I, World War II, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but not during the Korean, Vietnam, and First Gulf Wars).
99 It is also worth noting that the absence of conspicuous executive failures to get laws passed is not especially probative. The system of bicameralism and presentment created by Article I, § 7, creates conditions in which “players realize that their preferences may have to be compromised to guarantee the cooperation of other players as required by the constitutional structure.” William N. Eskridge Jr, Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 77 (Thomson West 4th ed 2007). Under those conditions, the executive’s request of Congress will itself be a function of what Congress is likely to accept. Presidents are likely to have good information about how Congress will respond to proposals, and little incentive to seem weak by pushing for a new law that will be denied.
100 I am grateful to Professor Trevor Morrison for emphasizing to me the significance of the baseline problem.
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presidential administration as a perfect substitute. Legislation implementing congressional control of the purse is also a significant, if imperfect, tool of legislative influence on the ground. This is true even when Presidents influence the budgetary agenda
101 and agencies jawbone their legislative masters into new funding.102 If Congress and statutory frameworks seem to have such nontrivial effects on the executive’s choice set, this at minimum implies that the conditions in which law matters are more extensive than The Executive Unbound suggests and that an account of executive discretion that omits law and legal institutions will be incomplete.
B. The Motivational Status of Law
But why should Presidents attend to statutory constraints or Congress in the first place? What stops Henry Paulson from proceeding with the bailout without waiting for new appropriations? Or President Obama from sua sponte issuing new debt or transferring Guantánamo detainees? The political economy developed in The Executive Unbound suggests that executive branch officials have no reason to heed legal and institutional constraints absent the possibility of credibility gains. PV also suggest that legislators and judges defer to the executive because of the latter’s superior institutional competence (pp 107–08).103 Recognizing the “inevitable” (p 103), they stay their hand rather than needlessly expend effort. This account of executive dominance, however, rests on an incomplete theory of political actors’ and judges’ motivations.104
PV’s rendition of the relevant motivations rests on rational choice foundations. Rational choice models take individuals as the
101 Some presidential control is a function of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 42 Stat 20, codified as amended in various sections of Title 31, (vesting the President with proposal power respecting many parts of the federal budget). See Dam, 44 U Chi L Rev at 278 (cited in note 81) (stating the Act was “designed to substitute central presidential planning for the prior practice” of individual agency submissions to Congress).
102 See generally Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 (Princeton 2001) (finding, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that mid-level administrators lobbied Congress to secure administrative reorderings).
103 PV further argue that legislators have “pragmatic reasons” to leave the executive with broad discretion (pp 107–08).
104 Consider Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences 107 (Cambridge 2007) (“[E]xplanation[s] of [ ] behavior must often appeal to [ ] beliefs about the motivations of others.”).
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central unit of analysis.
105 They assume individuals “form rational beliefs, including beliefs about the options available to them” and then take actions that maximize preferences “given [those] beliefs.”106 Rational choice explanations come in “thick” and “thin” forms.107 Thin forms make no assumptions about the content of individuals’ preferences; thick accounts do.108 The strong law/politics dichotomy rests on “thick” rational choice assumptions.109 Political actors and judges are not only utility maximizers, their utilities also have defined content. Specifically, they have preferences over first-order policy outcomes, but not over second-order goals such as legality and constitutionality.110
This distinction between first-order and second-order preferences is not explicitly stated in The Executive Unbound. But it is omnipresent. The sole reason the President recognizes constraints is to obtain credibility that yields further “power” to achieve particular policy ends (p 153). Legislators capitulate before executive initiatives because they recognize them to be “inescapable” (p 108). Judges “remain quiet” because they recognize the “sharp pragmatic limits” on what they can do (pp 35–37). In all these arguments, political actors and judges are characterized as acting on the basis of expected policy outcomes. The possibility that their choices will reflect normative preferences for legality and constitutionality with a “dimension of ‘oughtness’”111 does not enter the analysis.112
This account of first-order preferences, which underwrites the law/politics dichotomy, embodies controversial assumptions. Notice, at the threshold, that arguments from inevitability or inescapability
105 See Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice: A Critique of Applications in Political Science 16 (Yale 1994).
106 Elster, Explaining Social Behavior at 191 (cited in note 104). See also Jon Elster, Introduction, in Jon Elster, ed, Rational Choice 1, 5 (NYU 1986) (“The normatively proper decision criterion [in rational choice theory] under risk is to choose the option that maximizes expected utility.”).
107 See Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Usable Theory: Analytic Tools for Social and Political Research 30 (Princeton 2009); Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice at 17–18 (cited in note 105).
108 See Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice at 17–18 (cited in note 105).
109 In this regard, the dichotomy is consistent with much recent political science work, which also rests on “unambiguously thick-rational assumptions.” See id at 19.
110 For this reason, I do not believe it is adequate to defend the use of thick preferences based on the need for a parsimonious analytical framework. It is true, to be sure, that excluding normative preferences from the analysis makes the latter more tractable. But when that exclusion preordains the answer to the question whether law or politics is more effective, I think it is an unwarranted simplification.
111 Rueschemeyer, Usable Theory at 72 (cited in note 107).
112 Note that my argument here does not concern the limits of rationality, such as those imposed by bounded rationality. Rather it trains on the stipulated content of preferences.
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cannot be literally true either for the courts or the legislative branch. It is not impossible for judges to issue timely preliminary injunctions. Nor is Congress necessarily disabled from quick action, as its first-blush response to 9/11 demonstrates. Rather, the inevitability argument relies on an implicit, unstated claim that judges and legislators accept comparative institutional competence arguments in favor of executive-branch primacy.
113 Courts and Congress, that is, are said to refrain from acting because they recognize that “institutional capacities” make it “inevitable” for the executive to take the lead (p 105).114 But it is not at all clear whether judges and legislators accept the “essentially normative” claim that “our nation would be safer . . . if judges [or Congress] appropriately deferred to their [ ] presidents.”115 What judges and legislators believe is an empirical question, a question on which The Executive Unbound adduces no evidence. Absent an empirical foundation, it nonetheless seems implausible (at least to me) to assert that federal judges and legislators have uniformly internalized a controversial logic that teaches them their own impotence.116
Equally peculiar, the strong law/politics dichotomy omits normative preferences respecting legality and constitutionality from political actors’ calculus. It thus rests on a strong assumption about the narrowly consequential nature of executive branch actors’ utility function. This is of concern for three reasons. First, a model that makes the predicate assumption that political actors do not have preferences over legality or constitutionality will always find political restraints to be more effective than legal ones. It is not clear law can ever explain fully official behavior if political actors have preferences over policy outcomes, but not over the legality of the methods used to obtain those outcomes. H.L.A. Hart famously argued that law rests ultimately on the fact that “officials of the system” view it as the source of “common standards of official behaviour” against which they “appraise critically their own and each other’s deviations as lapses.”117 If Hart’s claim is correct, officials’ “acceptance” of
113 For an argument that at least in the national security context, claims of comparative institutional competence founded on the American Separation of Powers are surprisingly fragile, see Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 Cal L Rev (forthcoming 2012).
114 See also p 31.
115 William G. Howell, Presidential Power in War, 2011 Ann Rev Pol Sci 89, 101.
116 On the other hand, PV’s claim may have in practice the circular quality of a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, judges and legislators may come to believe that they are not institutionally qualified not out of direct experience but because they are repeatedly told so by influential commentators such as PV.
117 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 116–17 (Oxford 2d ed 1994).
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normative standards is the sociological fact upon which a modern legal system necessarily rests.
118 Absent such normative preferences, law has no grasp upon official behavior. In The Executive Unbound, it is categorically excluded from the domain of possible causes. By bracketing off normative preferences, the book thus stacks the explanatory deck against law.
Second, the omission of normative preferences about legality is in tension with the historical record.119 Ample evidence shows executive-branch officials to have normative preferences about legality and constitutionality. Deliberation on legal and constitutional questions within the executive branch is highly structured along channels that are reportedly entrenched.120 Recent insider accounts of national security lawmaking hence underscore thick “cultural norms” respecting the law within the executive branch, although they can also be read to suggest that the commitment to legality was occasionally uneven.121 Even the Bush administration, which has been accused of a cavalier attitude to the law, appeared to insist on the legality and constitutionality of its most controversial actions at some cost.122 There is also an extensive literature documenting how lawyers within the Justice Department take account of the normative force of law even when their clients within the executive branch are more cavalier.123
118 Id at 117. See also id at 6.
119 Consider Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy 3 (Chicago 1995) (criticizing the “empirically implausible view that human beings are, for the most part, instrumentally rational and naturally self-regarding”).
120 See Executive Order No 12146, 3 CFR 409, 411 (1980) (providing for coordinated legal review of constitutional questions within the executive). See also Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum L Rev 1448, 1470–92 (2010).
121 See Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush Administration 37 (Norton 2007). Goldsmith also explains how the availability of executive branch lawyers to argue “without any citation of authority” for sweeping executive power was a “godsend.” Id at 98.
122 See Benjamin A. Kleinerman, The Discretionary President: The Promise and Peril of Executive Power 4–5 (Kansas 2009) (describing and criticizing efforts to maintain legality during the Bush administration). It is especially worth noting that external accounts of military lawyers’ involvement in counterterrorism operations support the idea that law plays a role in their preferences. Goldsmith, Power and Constraint at 135–46 (cited in note 21) (discussing the influence of lawyers in targeting decisions).
123 See, for example, Trevor W. Morrison, Book Review, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 Harv L Rev 1688, 1707–30 (2011), reviewing Bruce Ackerman, Decline and Fall (cited in note 5); Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 Admin L Rev 1303, 1305–06, 1308–09 (2000). I am assuming here that such insider accounts of executive legality are accurate. But there is insufficient independent evidence to ascertain whether this is so, or to ascertain whether political superiors will manipulate the occasions for advice seeking or the sources of advice to obtain sought-after outcomes (although some of Professor Morrison’s recent empirical work does support the
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Of course, it is possible that all such anecdotal evidence reflects an optimistic hindsight bias on the part of insiders seeking to burnish their own credentials. I doubt this.124 It would indeed be surprising if federal officials did not generally take the law seriously given the normative force accorded to constitutional and legal norms in contemporary American society.125 All federal officers—not just lawyers within the Department of Justice—also swear or affirm a mandatory oath “to support this Constitution” before exercising their powers.126 Certainly it is conceivable that no federal official taking this oath has meaningful preferences over the constitutionality of his or her actions. This skeptical conclusion would be surprising, though, in light of the weak evidence that such oaths are routinely ignored.127
Alternatively, it may be that expressions of legalistic preferences are held only by lower-level officials, while senior policy makers have no illusions about the weak effect of the law. But recall that some of the examples of law talk I canvassed in the introduction came from senior policy makers, such as the President and the secretary of the treasury.128 To conclude that all use of legalism by senior officials is merely cheap talk without some substantial evidence on that score seems again incautious. This is especially so since both the President and the secretary of the treasury arguably paid a price in terms of nonattainment of policy preferences by sticking to their constitutional guns.
Third, where The Executive Unbound does take into account normative preferences, it does so by assimilating them to purely instrumental judgments about consequences. For example, PV claim courts will stay their hand because they lack “legitimacy.” Judges know they are ill-equipped to second-guess executive policy judg-ments, and so do not act for fear of losing public support (pp 30–31).129 This equates legitimacy with efficacy. It assumes judgments of legitimacy are correlated to policy outcomes. But that equation is inconsistent with available evidence. Studies of legitimacy do not
conclusions drawn here). See Morrison, 124 Harv L Rev at 1718 (cited in note 123). To some extent, therefore, my argument here rests on empirical points that are necessarily impressionistic. I am grateful to Professor Vermeule for pressing me on this last point.
124 To be clear, I draw here on no executive-branch experience of my own.
125 See, for example, Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 9–53 (Princeton 1988) (examining the Constitution as the source of a “civil religion”).
126 US Const Art VI, § 3.
127 See note 123. See also Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 Va L Rev 253, 259 (1996).
128 See notes 4, 18, and accompanying text.
129 PV argue that courts defer to the executive because of a “legitimacy deficit” (p 30).
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show that views of, for example, the Supreme Court are a function of outcomes. To the contrary, support for the Court “has little to do with ideology or partisanship” but “is grounded in broader commitments to democratic institutions and processes.”
130 And external legitimacy judgments of law enforcement bodies, even in the fraught context of national security, are not driven by perceptions of efficiency but by ideals of fairness and procedural justice.131 Scholars of all ideological stripes tend to endorse the notion that “a reputation for restraint and commitment to the rule of law” will “legitimate the extraordinary powers the President must exercise in the long term” against national security threats.132 Cross-national studies of legitimacy also identify a complex bundle of legitimacy predictors, including participation rights, welfare rights, and accountability.133
The Executive Unbound’s view of legitimacy is in any event symptomatic of a more diffuse skepticism of normative preferences. No doubt this captures the standpoint of some official actors, who really do take the perspective of a Holmesian bad man. But that seems inadequate as a more general description of contemporary political actors’ beliefs and motivations. Foolishly or not, American officials often appear to hold strong views about legality and the Constitution. A positive political economy of executive constraint and discretion is surely incomplete without an accounting of those preferences.
C. Political Theory and Legal Constraint
A third strand of The Executive Unbound’s skepticism about legal constraints is its critique of the Madisonian theory of separation of powers (pp 19–31). Liberal legalism is said to be inadequate
130 James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and Confirmations: Positivity Theory and the Judgments of the American People 61 (Princeton 2009). See also Gregory A. Caldeira and James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 Am J Pol Sci 635, 644–45 (1992) (reporting no relationship between diffuse support for the Court and specific policy goals).
REVIEWS
(Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics
Aziz Z. Huq
The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule. Oxford, 2010. Pp 3, 249.
INTRODUCTION
Consider a recent snapshot of our imperial presidency. It is Thursday, September 25, 2008, in the Roosevelt Room of the White House. We are at the heart of the financial meltdown.1 Not two weeks before, investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, jeopardizing hundreds of creditor counterparties, including major financial institutions. The following day, insurance giant American International Group (AIG) discloses enormous losses on credit default swaps, prompting the Federal Reserve to extend an emergency loan of $85 billion in exchange for a 79.9 percent equity stake in the company. One of the nation’s oldest money market funds, Reserve Primary Fund, experiences a run, collapsing to an unprecedented share price of less than a dollar and “breaking the buck.” It is clear the Treasury and the Federal Reserve need more funds to forestall a general liquidity crunch. In the Roosevelt Room, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson Jr and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke are addressing skeptical congressional leaders and the two presidential candidates, explaining
† Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
Thanks to Daniel Abebe, Bernard Harcourt, Rick Hills, Trevor Morrison, Eric Posner, and Adrian Vermeule for their insightful and helpful comments, and to Eileen Ho for excellent research assistance. I am especially grateful to Professor Posner for graciously suggesting that I look closely at one of his books. I am pleased to acknowledge the support of the Frank Cicero, Jr Faculty Fund. All errors herein are mine alone.
1 This account draws mainly on Simon Johnson and James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown 157–80 (Pantheon 2010); David Wessel, In Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War on the Great Panic 188–216 (Crown 2009). See also David M. Herszenhorn, Carl Hulse, and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Day of Chaos Grips Washington; Fate of Bailout Plan Unresolved, NY Times A1 (Sept 26, 2008); Matthew Karnitschnig, et al, U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, Wall St J A1 (Sept 17, 2008).
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that the “limits of the Fed’s legal authority” have been reached and that legislative action is needed to prevent “a depression greater than the Great Depression.”
2 The meeting ends in disarray, a “partisan free-for-all.”3 And as the meeting breaks up, a desperate Paulson approaches Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and—here’s the kicker—“literally bent down on one knee,” pleads for congressional action.4
It is close to a tenet of faith among constitutional scholars of diverse persuasions that ours is a republic dominated by the executive branch.5 Economies of bureaucratic scale, coupled with the executive’s primacy in responding to new security, economic, and environmental crises, are said to have frayed the Constitution’s delicate interbranch balance of powers.6 As a consequence, it is conventional wisdom that our President is now “imperial,” and Congress “broken.”7 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule—hereinafter collectively “PV”—are among the most sophisticated advocates of this dictum. But with a twist. Drawing on political science, game theory models, and the economics of agency relationships, their book The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic proposes that neither law nor legally constituted institutions (that is, Congress and courts) in practice impose meaningful constraints on the federal executive. This is so, PV say, not only in the heat of emergency but
2 Wessel, In Fed We Trust at 202 (cited in note 1).
3 Id at 215.
4 Herszenhorn, Day of Chaos, NY Times at A1 (cited in note 1).
5 For some recent examples, see Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic 141, 184–85 (Harvard 2010) (describing an “institutional presidency [ ] on the march”); Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 Minn L Rev 1789, 1810–43 (2010) (characterizing the American presidency as a “constitutional dictatorship”); William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 Yale L J 2446, 2449 (2006) (“We live in an era of increasing (and, some would say, increasingly unchecked) presidential power.”); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L J 1725, 1727 (1996) (“The dominance of executive power ought by now, to lift a phrase from Charles Black, to be a matter of common notoriety not so much for judicial notice as for background knowledge of educated people who live in this republic.”). See also John Yoo, Politics as Law? The Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 Cal L Rev 851, 874–75 (2001) (discussing “the President’s constitutional and structural superiority in conducting foreign affairs,” and the “overwhelming executive dominance in foreign affairs”).
6 See Aziz Z. Huq, Imperial March, Democracy 44, 46–53 (Winter 2008) (summarizing historical trends). For a more celebratory history of the rise of executive power, see generally Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush (Yale 2008).
7 See Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, The Imperial Presidency 377–419 (Houghton Mifflin 2004); Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track 1–13 (Oxford 2006).
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also in the ordinary run of administration (pp 4–5).
8 Succinctly put, their thesis is that “major constraints on the executive . . . do not arise from law or from the separation-of-powers framework” (p 4).9 But then, diverging from conventional narratives of executive supremacy, PV caution that the executive branch is not completely “unbound” either in ordinary times or in times of crisis.10 Echoing Madison, they locate a residual “primary controul on the government” in “the people.”11 Rather than legal rules or Congress, it is the strong undertow of democratic sentiment that tugs and binds executive discretion in practice. While The Executive Unbound is largely devoted to developing these descriptive claims with “social-scientific” precision (p 123)—a task PV pursue with verve, aplomb, and considerable force—it also gestures toward a normative claim: executive dominance within the bounds set by popular control is not merely inevitable but for the best.12
And yet . . . why then did Henry Paulson get down on one knee before Nancy Pelosi to ask for Congress to act? The timing and subject matter of the genuflection make his gesture especially puzzling. Paulson’s request concerned a highly technical matter, about which the executive had a clear institutional advantage.13 Increased sophistication in financial technologies of securitization and derivative design importantly impelled Lehman’s and then AIG’s crises.14 Few members of Congress have much inkling of “[t]he efficient market hypothesis, the capital asset pricing model, [and] the
8 “Legislators and courts [ ] are continually behind the pace of events in the administrative state; they play an essentially reactive and marginal role. . . . And in crises, the executive governs nearly alone. . . . Although we pay special attention to times of crisis, our thesis is not limited to those times” (pp 4–5).
9 Emphasis added.
10 The thesis of The Executive Unbound is also not constrained to a particular subject-matter domain, such as foreign affairs or national security law. For a crisp and effectively focused argument that trains on the former domain, see generally Daniel Abebe and Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism, 51 Va J Intl L 507 (2011).
11 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 349 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed).
12 For a normative argument by one of the authors that courts ought to show greater deference to executive rule making and adjudication in certain cases, see Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L J 1170, 1204 (2007) (arguing that the executive is best placed to resolve difficult foreign affairs questions requiring judgments of policy and principle, and that the judiciary should defer to the executive based on its foreign policy expertise).
13 Johnson and Kwak, 13 Bankers at 9 (cited in note 1).
14 This increased sophistication was also the basis for regulators’ ex ante confidence that no crisis would likely emerge. See Raghuram G. Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy 112–14 (Princeton 2010) (describing the famous “Greenspan put”).
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Black-Scholes option-pricing model.”
15 Compounding legislators’ institutional disadvantage, September 2008 was a moment of crisis. Treasury and Federal Reserve officials discerned a significant probability of catastrophic illiquidity in credit and repo markets. The need to act was believed acute. Under these tight conditions, legislators might be thought to “rationally submit[ ]” to executive demands (p 60). If ever a “blank check”16 was needed, this was surely the moment.
Of course, you know how the story ends. As recounted in The Executive Unbound, Congress did eventually relent and enact new fiscal authorities, although not without a full measure of indecorous wrangling (pp 47–48). As glossed by PV, “Congress pushed back somewhat” but was still “fundamentally driven by events and by executive proposals” (pp 50–51). The theatrics of a single Thursday, their account implies, do not provide an accurate synecdoche for the executive-legislative relationship.
But this moves too fast. For one thing, the executive, as much as Congress, was “driven by events” in the course of the financial crisis.17 For another, the claim that executive dominance characterizes interbranch relations in crisis is inconsistent with the behavior and beliefs of participants in the relevant events. Henry Merritt Paulson Jr, the six-foot-one former chief executive officer of Goldman Sachs, is hardly the sort to bow down lightly. Nor is his legalistic impulse isolated. In the midst of the summer 2011 debt ceiling showdown, President Barack Obama made a similar point:
I’m sympathetic to [the] view that this would be easier if I could do this entirely on my own. It would mean all these conversations I’ve had over the last three weeks, I could have been spending time with Malia and Sasha instead. But that’s not how our democracy works, and as I said, Americans made a decision about divided government that I wish I could undo.18
15 Justin Fox, The Myth of the Rational Market: A History of Risk, Reward, and Delusion on Wall Street 320 (HarperCollins 2009).
16 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 536 (2004) (plurality).
17 See David Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and Its (Unintended) Consequences 12–13 (Wiley & Sons 2011) (criticizing the policy responses to the financial crisis as “ad hoc”); Steven M. Davidoff and David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 Admin L Rev 463, 466 (2009) (characterizing the government’s response to the financial crisis as animated by a “dealmaking ethos”).
18 Howard Portnoy, Obama: King for a Day?, HotAir Blog (July 23, 2011), online at http://hotair.com/greenroom/archives/2011/07/23/obama-king-for-a-day/ (visited Nov 17, 2011) (describing the town hall event where Obama appeared wistful about the thought of possessing the unilateral power to raise the debt ceiling); Steve Benen, Obama Weighs in on
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A plausible political economy account of executive power, in my view, should be able to explain Paulson’s observed behavior and Obama’s expressed sentiments about “how our democracy works.” It should not write them off ab initio as either irrelevant or insincere.19
Paulson’s genuflection and Obama’s reticence, I will contend here, are symptomatic of our political system’s operation rather than being aberrational. It is generally the case that even in the heart of crisis, and even on matters where executive competence is supposedly at an acme, legislators employ formal institutional powers not only to delay executive initiatives but also affirmatively to end presidential policies.20 Numerous examples from recent events illustrate the point. Congressional adversaries of Obama, for instance, cut off his policy of emptying Guantánamo Bay via appropriations riders.21 Deficit hawks spent 2011 resisting the President’s solutions to federal debt, while the President declined to short-circuit negotiations with unilateral action.22 Even in military matters, a growing body of empirical research suggests Congress often successfully influences the course of overseas engagements to a greater degree than legal scholars have discerned or acknowledged.23
‘Constitutional Option,’ Political Animal Blog (Wash Monthly July 22, 2011), online at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-animal/2011_07/obama_weighs_in_on_constitutio 031036.php (visited Nov 17, 2011) (quoting President Obama as rejecting unilateral action to issue new debt).
19 See Part II.B (developing the argument in favor of taking such sentiments seriously at length).
20 See Part II.A (developing further examples).
21 See, for example, Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub L No 111-383 § 1032, 124 Stat 4137, 4351–53 (prohibiting the expenditure of Pentagon funds on detainee transfers). Underscoring the salience of interbranch agreement in respect to national security initiatives, Professor Jack Goldsmith argues that President Bush’s counterterrorism initiative survived to the extent they were “vetted, altered, blessed—with restrictions and accountability strings attached—by the other branches of the U.S. government.” Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency after 9/11 xii–xiii (W.W. Norton 2012). Elsewhere, Goldsmith asserts a different theory of policy continuity when he claims that “Obama stuck with the Bush policies [because] many of them were irreversibly woven into the fabric of national security architecture.” Id at 27. I concur that it is plausible to think that intragovernmental resistance, arising from agencies’ sunk costs in the development of certain policies or institutional identification with those policies, provides an alternative explanation for the persistence of policies between administrations. It is a task for future empirical and analytic work to disaggregate which of the causes Goldsmith identifies is most important.
22 See Jeffrey Sparshott, Obama Skirts Question on 14th Amendment’s Place in Debt Talks, Wash Wire Blog (Wall St J July 8, 2011), online at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire /2011/07/06/obama-skirts-question-on-14th-amendments-place-in-debt-talks/ (visited Nov 17, 2011) (quoting President Obama’s statement “I don’t think we should even get to the constitutional issue” implicated by the debt ceiling).
23 See Douglas L. Kriner, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents and the Politics of Waging War 285 (Chicago 2011) (arguing that “members of Congress have historically engaged
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That work suggests that the failure of absolute congressional control over military matters cannot be taken as evidence of “the inability of law to constrain the executive” in more subtle ways (p 5). The conventional narrative of executive dominance, in other words, is at best incomplete and demands supplementing.
This Review uses The Executive Unbound as a platform to explore how the boundaries of discretionary executive action are established. As the controversial national security policies of the Bush administration recede in time, the issue of executive power becomes ripe for reconsideration. Arguments for or against binding the executive are starting to lose their partisan coloration. There is more room to investigate the dynamics of executive power in a purely positive fashion without the impinging taint of ideological coloration.
Notwithstanding this emerging space for analysis, there is still surprising inattention to evidence of whether the executive is constrained and to the positive question of how constraint works. The Executive Unbound is a significant advance because it takes seriously this second “mechanism question.” Future studies of the executive branch will ignore its important and trenchant analysis at their peril.24 Following PV’s lead, I focus on the descriptive, positive question of how the executive is constrained. I do speak briefly and in concluding to normative matters. But first and foremost, my arguments should be understood as positive and not normative in nature unless otherwise noted.
Articulating and answering the question “What binds the executive?”, The Executive Unbound draws a sharp line between legal and political constraints on discretion—a distinction between laws and institutions on the one hand, and the incentives created by political competition on the other hand. While legal constraints usually fail, it argues, political constraints can prevail. PV thus postulate what I call a “strong law/politics dichotomy.” My central claim in this Review is that this strong law/politics dichotomy cannot withstand scrutiny. While doctrinal scholars exaggerate law’s autonomy, I contend, the realists PV underestimate the extent to which legal rules and institutions play a pivotal role in the production
in a variety of actions from formal initiatives, such as introducing legislation or holding hearings that challenge the President’s conduct of military action, to informal efforts to shape the nature of the policy debate [on wars]”); William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force, 59 Intl Org 209, 228–29 (2005).
24 This Review does not catalog all of the many ways in which The Executive Unbound makes contributions to the study of the executive branch because it aims to build upon and extend that analysis.
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of executive constraint. Further, the political mechanisms they identify as substitutes for legal checks cannot alone do the work of regulating executive discretion. Diverging from both legalist and realist positions, I suggest that law and politics do not operate as substitutes in the regulation of executive authority.
25 They instead work as interlocking complements. An account of the borders of executive discretion must focus on the interaction of partisan and electoral forces on the one hand and legal rules. It must specify the conditions under which the interaction of political actors’ exertions and legal rules will prove effective in limiting such discretion.
Without embarking on the ambitious task of supplying a general theory of such interactions, I will suggest that an accurate political economy of executive restraint must identify a range of mechanisms in which both legal and political elements play roles. The primary aim of this Review is to clear ground for this account by rejecting “law only” and “politics only” explanations in favor of models with space for the interlocking operation of law and politics. To that end, I develop several examples that are suggestive of the potentially complementary operation of legal and political forces. I make no claim that these examples are exhaustive. To the contrary, I suspect that the dynamic interaction of legal rules and political forces takes many different forms depending on the background legal infrastructure and contingent features of the political environment. No brief catalog could capture their heterogeneity.
The caveats and modifications I offer to PV’s descriptive claims about the efficacy of law and politics may additionally have implications for a normative evaluation of executive dominance. If the latter is neither politically inevitable nor precisely calibrated, it cannot be assumed that executive policy choices are always for the best. I also point to recent changes in national politics that may be increasingly undermining the possibility of coproduced legal-political constraints. My positive account of executive constraint hence suggests that the executive may be, as PV’s title suggests, “unbounded,” but not for the reasons that many believe and not in ways that conduce to socially desirable outcomes. This, I conclude, should foster pessimism about the future trajectory of executive-led governance.
The Review proceeds in four parts. Part I sketches PV’s central theme—the strong law/politics dichotomy. Part II challenges PV’s
25 Posner and Vermeule argue similarly in The Executive Unbound that “de facto political constraints [ ] have grown up and, to some degree, substituted for legal constraints on the executive” (p 5) (emphasis added).
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claim that law is irrelevant to limiting executive discretion. Part III then closely parses their account of strong political constraints. My aim in both Part II and Part III is not to carp about PV’s basic rational choice methodology, even though it is not universally shared but often contested. Rather, I aim to develop reasons within that framework for questioning some of their conclusions. Turning from the critical to the constructive, Part IV proposes that rather than acting as substitutes, politics and law may work as complements to coproduce limits on executive actions, although such coordination may be increasingly rare and fragile.
I. THE NEW CRITS
A neophyte consumer of legal scholarship might be forgiven for thinking that one of the terms of admission to law’s ivory tower is a public affirmation that law on its own matters. Yet there is a long line of thinkers, going back to the Legal Realists at the turn of the twentieth century, who “sought to weaken, if not dissolve, the law-politics dichotomy”26 and to infuse legal analysis with social-scientific method.27 In the late 1970s, the Critical Legal Studies movement set itself the task of unpacking the “contradictions” of “mainstream liberal thought” in ways that sapped the formal robustness of legal categories.28 More recently, empirical scholars have aimed to “produc[e] a New Legal Realism—an effort to understand the sources of judicial decisions on the basis of testable hypotheses and large data sets.”29
The Executive Unbound stands squarely in this plural tradition.30 Although it briefly nods to empirical legal studies, it is also usefully read as a descendant of Critical Legal Studies, albeit one that advances a quite different and distinct political and institutional program. Tracking the so-called Crit methodology, PV “refuse to
26 William M. Wiecek, Liberty under Law: The Supreme Court in American Life 187 (Johns Hopkins 1988). See also Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 Tex L Rev 731, 734 (2009) (arguing that skepticism about the rule-bound nature of judging predated the Legal Realists by three decades).
27 See Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927–1960 97 (North Carolina 1986) (“[T]he overriding concern of the average realist was to make the study of law more ‘realistic.’”).
28 Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 3 (Harvard 1987). See also Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement 8–11 (Harvard 1986) (identifying a “critique of formalism” as a central plank of the Critical Legal Studies agenda).
29 Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U Chi L Rev 831, 831 (2008).
30 See Harvey Mansfield, Book Review, The Inevitable Imperial President, NY Times BR12 (Mar 13, 2011) (“Posner and Vermeule belong to the school of legal realism.”).
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accept the ordinary distinction between epiphenomenal law and ‘real’ society.”
31 They also share a goal with Critical Legal Studies: “[T]o identify the crucial structural characteristics of mainstream legal thought as examples of something called ‘liberalism.’”32
Echoing Crit themes, The Executive Unbound mounts a sustained assault on dominant pieties of legal scholarship—the autonomy and relevance of legal and constitutional rules.33 Its central target is “liberal legalism.” This is defined as the view that “representative legislatures govern and should govern . . . [and] that law does and should constrain the executive” (p 3). Liberal legalists, in PV’s telling, emphasize two ways in which law limits executive power. First, law binds via the separation of powers—that is, by fashioning Congress and the courts as institutional counterweights to the executive. Second, it works through framework statutes and by specifying absolute limits in the form of enacted statutes. What the legalist focus on institutions and legal rules fails to discern, PV contend, is that both such mechanisms are ineffectual on the ground (p 7).34 By contrast, it is political mechanisms that do the real work in imposing limits on what the executive can do. Fleshing out the idea of a political mechanism, PV identify a “reelection constraint” on Presidents operating “in a polity dominated by a mass public accustomed to exercising a large degree of democratic control” (p 12).35 This in turn fosters in the White House a need to sustain “popularity and credibility” (p 13). In consequence, opponents of political liberalism such as Weimar- and Nazi-era legal theorist Carl Schmitt exaggerate in their criticism of democratic rule and their advocacy of “decisionism” the claim that power rests in the entity with authority to determine when rules apply or not (pp 32–34, 90–91).36
31 Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies at 253 (cited in note 28). The Crits, though, are distinctive in their emphasis on the necessary internal contradictions hidden within legal rules, reflecting the pervasiveness of social conflict. See id at 258–62. The Crits were also much more skeptical of social science results than Professors Posner and Vermeule. See id at 167–71.
32 Id at 2.
33 For an extended critique of the dominant mode of liberal legalism in the international context, see Eric A. Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism xii (Chicago 2009) (criticizing legalism as a “view that loses sight of the social function of law and sees it as an end in itself”).
34 “[O]ur main critical thesis is that liberal legalism has proven unable to generate meaningful constraints on the executive” (p 7).
35 In my reconstruction of PV’s account, I take a broader view of the political. See text accompanying note 216.
36 PV have elsewhere recoded much of Schmitt’s argument (stripped of its Catholic theological apparatus) as mid-level institutional insights of a kind that are familiar from political and economic analysis. See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Demystifying Schmitt *1–2 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No 10-47, Jan 26, 2011), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1723191 (visited Nov 17, 2011).
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Before fleshing out the strong law/politics dichotomy further, it is worth explaining briefly how PV prioritize the two strands of their argument. PV present their argument as the equal pursuit of “two main claims”—the fragility of law and the force of politics—and state at the threshold that their six-chapter book will be evenly split between the two theses (p 15). They indeed devote their first three chapters to the negative task of critiquing liberal legalism. But their fifth chapter then concerns the futility of (international) law as a constraint on executive action (pp 156–57).
37 And their final chapter attacks attitudes of suspicion toward the executive, which they call “tyrannophobia,” in order to demonstrate “a central fallacy of liberal legalism: the assumption that the only possible constraints on the executive are de jure constraints” (p 204). In all, five of their six chapters comprise attacks upon liberal liberalism. Only the fourth chapter discusses political constraints (pp 113–14). Viewed as a whole therefore, The Executive Unbound is principally a requiem for legal liberalism, not an ode to robust politics.
Consider first the case PV make against law and legal institutions as bulwarks against the executive. Their central argument rests on a logic of comparative institutional competence. Congress and judges alike, they argue, lack incentives or ability to gather and process information necessary to act quickly or to engage in oversight. Courts suffer from a “legitimacy deficit,” which dampens judicial willingness to intervene (pp 30–31, 57–58). And the separation of powers system can be gamed by an executive using a strategy of “divide and conquer” against the two other branches (pp 19–31).38 The net result is that Congress fails to anticipate crises and then is forced to delegate broad new powers after the fact (pp 43–52), while courts lag far behind executive initiatives.
PV also challenge the notion that framework statutes constrain the executive. Courts exercise a power of review pursuant to general framework statutes such as the Administrative Procedure Act.39 But,
37 This kind of argument has received extensive attention elsewhere. See, for example, Oona A. Hathaway and Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Book Review, Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law, 119 Harv L Rev 1404, 1420–26 (2006), reviewing Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford 2005).
38 See also pp 118–22 (summarizing studies that show separated powers do not yield optimal economic policies).
39 Pub L No 79-404, 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5. For a specific provision of the Administrative Procedure Act that authorizes judicial review of decisions by executive agencies, see 5 USC § 702.
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PV contend, such review has little influence on outcomes (pp 35–37).
40 PV identify a series of exceptions and tractable standards in the doctrinal and statutory structure of administrative law that make law so malleable as to impose no effective resistance to executive action (pp 89–103). PV see law’s plasticity as an “inevitable . . . matter of institutional capacities” (p 105).41 Further, they predict that courts will anticipate the superior ability of the executive to deal with complex technological and economic problems and fall into line (p 31).42 Similarly, a “reluctant” Congress will find legal plasticity “inescapable” (p 108).
Does anything limit the presidency? PV readily concede that the President is not “all-powerful” and the White House “does face some checks even from a generally supine Congress” (p 61). They also recognize “a handful of great [Supreme Court] cases in which judges have checked or constrained discretionary executive action” but style these as the exception, rather than the rule (pp 30–31). And they warn that “the president can exert control only in certain areas” (p 59). They do not, though, closely examine any specific judicial or legislative action to identify the operative mechanisms of constraint. And PV’s concessions on these issues play no large role in their descriptive account. They thus make no claim that law has any systematic function in the political economy of executive constraint. Notwithstanding fleeting caveats, therefore, a fair-minded reader of The Executive Unbound likely finishes the book with the impression that PV are highly skeptical that law plays any meaningful or substantial role in checking the executive.
Instead, PV claim, the main reason Presidents are not “all-powerful” is political checks (p 61).43 PV’s account of political checks is grounded in a view of the President as an agent of the public.44 In this principal-agent model, the public (which is the principal) has imperfect information as to whether the President (the agent) is “well-motivated” in the sense of “choos[ing] the policies that voters
40 For example, PV review evidence of judicial responses to post-9/11 security measures and find that judicial orders account for less than 4 percent of Guantánamo detainee releases (p 36).
41 Emphasis added. The claim is developed at greater length in Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 Harv L Rev 1095, 1096–98, 1132–36 (2009).
42 “Legislators and judges understand that the executive’s comparative institutional advantages in secrecy, force, and unity are all the more useful during emergencies . . . .” (p 31).
43 PV claim that “Congress’s main weapon for affecting presidential behavior is not the cumbersome and costly legal mechanism of legislation. Rather legislators appeal to the court of public opinion, which in turn constrains the president” (p 61).
44 The theory was initially set forth in Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U Chi L Rev 865, 874–83 (2007).
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would choose if they knew what the executive knows” (p 130). The public will therefore deny the President rewards such as reelection unless it receives a credible signal that the President is “well-motivated.” Hence, Presidents need to build their “credibility” with the public by demonstrating good motives. The search for credibility induces limits on executive behavior (pp 122–24, 129–33). To maintain credibility, a well-motivated executive cannot rely on demonstrating good outcomes, for there is an imperfect correlation between policy choices and outcomes. Instead, the well-motivated executive must take actions that would be unfeasibly costly if it had undesirable motives (p 123). For example, a well-motivated exe-cutive will share power with political adversaries and disclose information to demonstrate its bona fides,
45 while an ill-motivated executive would find these actions too costly. Paradoxically then, it is the very breadth of presidential discretion that induces a need to sustain popular trust, which in turn leads to actions that limit the exercise of executive power (pp 150–53).46
Credibility is the main mechanism of political control analyzed in The Executive Unbound. But PV hint at others. They point briefly to “a wealthy and highly educated population, whose elites continually scrutinize executive action and tighten the constraints of popularity and credibility” (p 14). Publicity is said to work through a “complex process by which the views of elites, interest groups, ordinary citizens, and others ultimately determine the de facto lines of political authority” (p 78).47 To be sure, elections rely on informed voters (who may not always be available) and can be used only periodically (pp 114–16). And since the enactment of the Twenty-Second Amendment in 1947,48 second-term Presidents have not faced reelection. Nevertheless, PV propose, even second-term Presidents worry about their “policy legacy and their place in history” (p 13). As a consequence, there is a public-regarding friction on even final-period Presidents’ decisions.
45 Possible signals include using the establishment of independent agencies or commissions, bipartisan appointments, actions that cut against partisan priors (the “Nixon goes to China” strategy), information disclosure, multilateral endorsements of contentious foreign military actions, strict liability for damages from executive policies, and “precommitting” to results through statutes (pp 141–50).
46 See also p 13.
47 For a more parsimonious and hence more generalizable account of the inevitable “political and psychological” power of simple majorities, see Adrian Vermeule, The Force of Majority Rule *26–27 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No 08-48, Oct 27, 2008), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1280201 (visited Nov 17, 2011).
48 US Const Amend XXII.
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To summarize, the strong law/politics dichotomy at the heart of The Executive Unbound rests on twin claims of law’s fragility and the effective force of politics. Rejecting traditional legal scholarship’s narrow focus on doctrine, PV’s theory predicts that Presidents can and do act forcefully except to the extent they perceive a credibility or publicity benefit from holding back.
49 Congress, the courts, and ex ante legal constraints, by contrast, are epiphenomenal and play little or no role. The account also has a normative sheen. By implication, executive dominance is not merely inevitable but to be welcomed given the presidency’s comparative advantage in policy making and in credibility-induced fidelity to democratic wishes.
II. THE SURPRISING RESILIENCE OF LAW
The Executive Unbound exposes canonical pieties about the efficacy of constitutional rules and statutory limits to corrosive scrutiny. Its account of law and legal institutions as weak forces, however, leaves no room for Paulson’s genuflection, Obama’s resistance to unilateral resolution of the debt crisis, or the current impasse over Guantánamo. In each of these cases, the logic of comparative institutional advantage points toward strong, even unilateral executive action. In each case, the executive arguably gains little credibility from seeking another branch’s consent. yet in each case, the executive has in fact held back from action ex proprio vigore. And in each case, officials do so apparently on the basis of sincere beliefs about the effective force of law.
This Part develops a case for taking law and institutions more seriously. Specifically, I examine three strands that run through The Executive Unbound’s skepticism toward law to probe their limits. First, PV portray law as historically and presently ineffective. With only minor caveats, they showcase an executive almost never inhibited by ex ante legal rules. Second, PV depict law as lacking the ability to motivate political actors. The fact that one option is legal and another is not therefore is never counted as a reason for picking the first option. Finally, PV contend there is no theoretical account in liberal political thought that explains the efficacy of legal and institutional chains. Law on this account fails not just in practice and in the minds of political actors, but also on the pages of the theorists.
49 Hence, PV argued during the debt ceiling crisis that President Obama should act unilaterally not only because a failure to do so would be “catastrophic” but because he would have had broad political support. See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Obama Should Raise the Debt Ceiling on His Own, NY Times (July 22, 2011), online at http://www.nytimes.com /2011/07/22/opinion/22posner.html (visited Nov 17, 2011).
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This Part lodges exceptions to each of these strands. I begin by highlighting evidence from the presidential studies and legal scholarship that the President is often constrained by other branches and by at least certain laws. Second, I explore evidence of political actors’ normative preferences respecting legality and constitutionality. Finally, I highlight resources in liberal political theory that help explain why legal and institutional constraints are effective. History, theory, and political psychology, I aim to show, provide toeholds for the law by showing how political actors have both normative and instrumental reasons for complying with the law.
I should be clear that my goal here is not to suggest that PV’s skepticism about legal constraints is categorically unwarranted. Concern that Presidents can on occasion play fast and loose with the law is unquestionably grounded in fact. It does not follow from my analysis that law is always, necessarily, or automatically effective—PV persuasively show it is often not for reasons sketched in Part I. My point is rather that law cannot be dismissed so quickly and that PV’s treatment of law as functionally marginal understates its actual salience.50 At least in some nontrivial set of conditions, law is relevant to the imposition of an effective constraint on the executive. It therefore must be awarded a substantial role in any general political economy of the executive branch.
A. Historical Evidence of Executive Constraint via Law
The Executive Unbound paints an image of executive discretion almost or completely unbridled by law or coequal branch. But PV also concede that “the president can exert control only in certain [policy] areas” (p 59).51 They give no account, however, of what limits a President’s discretionary actions. To remedy that gap, this Section explores how the President has been and continues to be hemmed in by Congress and law. My aim here is not to present a comprehensive account of law as a constraining mechanism. Nor is my claim that law is always effective. Both as a practical matter and as a result of administrative law doctrine, the executive has considerable authority to leverage ambiguities in statutory text into warrants for discretionary action.52 Rather, my more limited aspiration here is to
50 See text accompanying note 43 (describing PV’s caveats).
51 See also Posner and Vermeule, 74 U Chi L Rev at 889 (cited in note 44) (“We neither make, nor need to make, any general empirical claim that Congress has no control over executive discretion.”).
52 See pp 94–109 (identifying mechanisms for generating discretion in the face of legal constraint and contending that legislators and judges allow such discretion for “quite practical
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show that Congress and law do play a meaningful role in cabining executive discretion than The Executive Unbound credits. I start with Congress and then turn to the effect of statutory restrictions on the presidency.
Consider first a simple measure of Presidents’ ability to obtain policy change: Do they obtain the policy changes they desire? Every President enters office with an agenda they wish to accomplish.53 President Obama came into office, for example, promising health care reform, a cap-and-trade solution to climate change, and major immigration reform.54 President George W. Bush came to the White House committed to educational reform, social security reform, and a new approach to energy issues.55 One way of assessing presidential influence is by examining how such presidential agendas fare, and asking whether congressional obstruction or legal impediments—which could take the form of existing laws that preclude an executive policy change or an absence of statutory authority for desired executive action—is correlated with presidential failure. Such a correlation would be prima facie evidence that institutions and laws play some meaningful role in the production of constraints on executive discretion.
Both recent experience and long-term historical data suggest presidential agenda items are rarely achieved, and that legal or institutional impediments to White House aspirations are part of the reason. In both the last two presidencies, the White House obtained at least one item on its agenda—education for Bush and health care for Obama—but failed to secure others in Congress. Such limited success is not new. His famous first hundred days notwithstanding, Franklin Delano Roosevelt saw many of his “proposals for reconstruction [of government] . . . rejected outright.”56 Even in the midst of economic crisis, Congress successfully resisted New Deal initiatives from the White House. This historical evidence suggests that the diminished success of presidential agendas cannot be
reasons”); Ackerman, Decline and Fall 87–89 (cited in note 5) (arguing that the executive has developed new institutional tools to “give [a] constitutional imprimatur to presidential power grabs”).
53 See Paul C. Light, The President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton 2–3 (Johns Hopkins 3d ed 1999) (defining the agenda as a signal that “indicates what the President believes to be the most important issues facing his administration”).
54 Matt Welch and Nick Gillespie, What’s Next, Mr. President—Cardigans?, Wash Post B9 (July 19, 2009).
55 Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha and Tom Miles, George W. Bush’s Domestic Policy Agenda, 29 Am Rev Pol 351, 356–57 (2008).
56 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton 32 (Belknap rev ed 1997).
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ascribed solely to the narrowing scope of congressional attention in recent decades; it is an older phenomenon. Nevertheless, in more recent periods, presidential agendas have shrunk even more. President George W. Bush’s legislative agenda was “half as large as Richard Nixon’s first-term agenda in 1969–72, a third smaller than Ronald Reagan’s first-term agenda in 1981–84, and a quarter smaller than his father’s first-term agenda in 1989–92.”
57 The White House not only cannot always get what it wants from Congress but has substantially downsized its policy ambitions.
Supplementing this evidence of presidential weakness are studies of the determinants of White House success on Capitol Hill. These find that “presidency-centered explanations” do little work.58 Presidents’ legislative agendas succeed not because of the intrinsic institutional characteristics of the executive branch, but rather as a consequence of favorable political conditions within the momentarily dominant legislative coalition.59 Again, correlational evidence suggests that institutions and the legal frameworks making up the statutory status quo ante play a role in delimiting executive discretion.
But attention to the White House’s legislative agenda may be misleading. Perhaps the dwindling of legislative agendas is offset by newly minted technologies of direct “presidential administration.”60 The original advocate of this governance strategy has conceded, however, that presidential administration is available only when “Congress has left [ ] power in presidential hands.”61 Where there is no plausible statutory or constitutional foundation for a White House agenda-item, or where there is a perceived need for additional congressional action in the form of new appropriations or the like, Presidents cannot act alone.
The notion of a legislatively constrained presidential agenda is consistent with two canonical political science accounts of the contemporary presidency. Richard Neustadt, perhaps the most influential presidential scholar of the twentieth century,
57 Paul C. Light, Fact Sheet on the President’s Domestic Agenda *2 (Brookings Institute Oct 12, 2004), online at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2004/1012governance_light.aspx (visited Nov 17, 2011).
58 See Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena x (Chicago 1990).
59 See id at 117 (concluding that it is “the distribution of partisan and ideological forces [among Congressmen that] sets the basic parameters of presidential success or failure in Congress”). This evidence reinforces the inference that it is not merely the shrinking of congressional agendas that drives a smaller presidential agenda.
60 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv L Rev 2245, 2282–90 (2001).
61 Id at 2251.
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encapsulated the Constitution’s system as one of “separated institutions sharing powers” in which “a President will often be unable to obtain congressional action on his terms or even . . . halt action he opposes.”
62 Writing in 1990, Neustadt concluded that the President “still shares most of his authority with others and is no more free than formerly to rule by command.”63 Neustadt’s finding of a weak presidency rested in part on his discernment of political constraints. But he also stressed “Congress and its key committees” as necessary partners in the production of policy.64 Neustadt thus identified institutions, as much as public opinion, as impediments to the White House.
In harmony with Neustadt’s view, Stephen Skowronek’s magisterial survey of presidential leadership suggests Presidents are not free to ignore or sideline Congress. Skowronek points out that “[i]t is not just that the presidency has gradually become more powerful and independent over the course of American history, but that the institutions and interests surrounding it have as well.”65 His complex argument (much simplified) situates presidential authority within a cyclical pattern of political “regime” creation, maintenance, and disintegration.66 In this cycle, the presidency is primarily a destructive force. Chief executives affiliated with past regimes have fewer tools at their disposal than oppositional leaders who “come[] to power with a measure of independence from established commitments and can more easily justify the disruptions that attend the exercise of power.”67 Executive discretion, in this account, is a function of a President’s location in the cycle of historical change. It is not a necessary attribute of the institution.
Skowronek also argues that Congress maintains and enforces prior regimes’ policy commitments against presidential innovation. He finds congressional abdication to be “virtually unknown to the modern presidency.”68 To the contrary, Skowronek contends, Congress has become more effective over time. Thomas Jefferson in the early 1800s, working with an “organizationally inchoate and politically malleable” legislature, had greater discretion than Ronald
62 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan 29, 32 (Free Press rev ed 1990) (emphasis omitted).
63 Id at 199 (emphasis added).
64 See id at 197, 199.
65 Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make at 31 (cited in note 56).
66 See id at 34–52.
67 Id at 35.
68 Id at 418.
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Reagan in the 1980s.
69 By President Reagan’s time in office, the “governmental norms and institutional modalities” used to resist presidential initiatives had secured sufficient political capital to become resilient to presidential efforts at change.70 Until then, political movements proposing greater presidential authority also tended to advocate “some new mechanisms designed to hold [presidential] powers to account.”71 Skowronek provides a useful corrective to the assumption that historical change occurs only at one end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Echoing Neustadt’s analysis, his bottom line is that the contemporary executive remains “constrained by Congress”72 in ways that meaningfully hinder achievement of presidential goals.73
Nevertheless, neither Neustadt nor Skowronek articulate the precise role of law in congressional obstruction of presidential goals. Perhaps observed executive reticence is merely a result of political calculations, consistent with PV’s core hypothesis. But the evidence that the limits on executive authority tend to arise when Congress or existing law preclude a discretionary act suggests that institutions and statutes do play a meaningful role. Such correlations do not, however, establish the precise mechanisms whereby laws and institutions impose frictions on the employment of executive discretion.
Alternatively, perhaps the Neustadt and Skowronek accounts can be explained solely in terms of Congress’s negative veto in bicameralism and presentment, which is anticipated by the White House and so delimits the scope of presidential agendas. This would suggest that Congress’s power is asymmetrical: it can block some
69 See Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make at 418 (cited in note 56).
70 See id. See also Keith E. Whittington and Daniel P. Carpenter, Executive Power in American Institutional Development, 1 Persp Polit 495, 508 (2003) (“In response [to unilateral executive action], Congress has fundamentally restructured itself in ways that would not have occurred in the absence of a more powerful executive branch.”).
71 Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 Harv L Rev 2070, 2079 (2009). See also Kagan, 114 Harv L Rev at 2251, 2320 (cited in note 60) (emphasizing also the continuing possibility of congressional controls).
72 Whittington and Carpenter, 1 Persp Polit at 508 (cited in note 70) (describing, for example, how Congress has “developed entirely new institutions to challenge presidential budgetary decisions”).
73 Hence, in other work, Skowronek and Karen Orren explain how Congress in the early 1970s rewrote federal forest management law in order to restrict President Nixon’s ability to use the impoundment power or the new Office of Management and Budget for deregulatory ends, and “to promote Congress as the final arbiter of agency priorities.” See Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development 168–69 (Cambridge 2004).
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executive initiatives but do little midstream to regulate the use of discretion powers already possessed by the presidency. Consistent with this interpretation, The Executive Unbound stresses the failure of framework laws passed after the Nixon presidency to regulate war and emergency powers (pp 86–87).
74 If the executive can so easily find work-arounds, PV explain, it follows that Congress also has less incentive to pass such laws. In the long term, the incentives for Congress to enact statutory limits on presidential authorities will accordingly atrophy.
There is some merit to this story. But in my view it again understates the observed effect of positive legal constraints on executive discretion. Recent scholarship, for example, has documented congressional influence on the shape of military policy via framework statutes. This work suggests Congress influences executive actions during military engagements through hearings and legislative proposals.75 Consistent with this account, two legal scholars have recently offered a revisionist history of constitutional war powers in which “Congress has been an active participant in setting the terms of battle,” in part because “congressional willingness to enact [ ] laws has only increased” over time.76 In the last decade, Congress has often taken the initiative on national security, such as enacting new statutes on military commissions in 2006 and 2009.77 Other recent landmark security reforms, such as a 2004
74 PV list the War Powers Resolution, the National Emergencies Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the Inspector General Act as examples. Their analysis of security-related statutes, however, is incomplete. At least until 2001, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub L No 95-511, 92 Stat 1783, codified at 50 USC § 1801 et seq, proved effective in regulating federal electronic surveillance outside the criminal investigation context. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Pub L No 89-487, 80 Stat 250 (1966), codified as amended at 5 USC § 552, which established an enforceable right of access to executive branch information, also likely influenced government behavior. FOIA litigation resulted in disclosures of significant documentary evidence of torture and abusive treatment of detainees. While both FISA and FOIA have their limits, and have been violated, neither is a wholesale failure.
75 See note 23. Some of the best-known examples concern American funding for the Nicaraguan Contras. See, for example, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985 § 8066(a), Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1837, 1935 (prohibiting expenditure of funds on aid to Nicaraguan Contras); Joint Resolution of Oct 3, 1984 § 106(c), Pub L No 98-441, 98 Stat 1699, 1700–01; Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 § 108, Pub L No 98-215, 97 Stat 1473, 1475; Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1983 § 793, Pub L No 97-377, 96 Stat 1833, 1865.
76 David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 Harv L Rev 941, 947 (2008) (emphasis added).
77 See Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA), Pub L No 111-84, title XVIII, 123 Stat 2574, codified at 10 USC § 948 et seq; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub L No 109-366, 120 Stat 2600, 2602–03, codified as amended at 10 USC § 948a et seq.
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statute restructuring the intelligence community,
78 also had only lukewarm Oval Office support.79 Measured against a baseline of threshold executive preferences then, Congress has achieved nontrivial successes in shaping national security policy and institutions through both legislated and nonlegislated actions even in the teeth of White House opposition.80
The same point emerges more forcefully from a review of our “fiscal constitution.”81 Article I, § 8 of the Constitution vests Congress with power to “lay and collect Taxes” and to “borrow Money on the credit of the United States,” while Article I, § 9 bars federal funds from being spent except “in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”82 Congress has enacted several framework statutes to effectuate the “powerful limitations” implicit in these clauses.83 The resulting law prevents the President from repudiating past policy commitments (as Skowronek suggests) as well as imposing barriers to novel executive initiatives that want for statutory authorization.84
Three statutes merit attention here. First, the Miscellaneous Receipts Act of 184985 requires that all funds “received from customs, from the sales of public lands, and from all miscellaneous sources, for the use of the United States, shall be paid . . . into the treasury of the
78 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub L No 108-458, 118 Stat 3638.
79 See Michael Warner, Legal Echoes: The National Security Act of 1947 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 17 Stan L & Pol Rev 303, 310 (2006) (“It is true that President Bush himself was not the engine of intelligence reform, but it is also likely that without his efforts on its behalf, the Intelligence Reform Act would never have reached a vote in Congress.”).
80 The same has been said of federal responses to the 2008 financial crisis. See Davidoff and Zaring, 61 Admin L Rev at 465 (cited in note 17) (“Although the government never . . . acted as if it felt very constrained by the law that limited its actions, we think that its legal constraints help to explain a great deal of the government response.”).
81 Kenneth W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U Chi L Rev 271, 271–72 (1977).
82 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1, 2; US Const Art I, § 9, cl 7.
83 Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L J 1343, 1345 (1988).
84 Congress’s power of the purse is not a perfect mechanism of control. To control agency slack, Congress may have to choose between either overfunding an agency and allowing some waste, or underfunding an agency at the cost of not achieving policy goals entirely. See Michael M. Ting, The “Power of the Purse” and Its Implications of Bureaucratic Policy-Making, 106 Pub Choice 243, 264–65 (2001) (describing the “double-edged sword” of fiscal control). See also Christopher R. Berry, Barry C. Burden, and William G. Howell, The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending, 104 Am Polit Sci Rev 783, 786–87 (2010) (finding evidence that suggests the White House, through the Office of Management and Budget, exercises considerable post-legislative control of fiscal flows).
85 Act of Mar 3, 1849, 9 Stat 398, codified as amended at 31 USC § 3302(b).
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United States.”
86 It ensures that the executive cannot establish off-balance-sheet revenue streams as a basis for independent policy making. Second, the Anti-Deficiency Act,87 which was first enacted in 1870 and then amended in 1906,88 had the effect of cementing the principle of congressional appropriations control.89 With civil and criminal sanctions, it prohibits “unfunded monetary liabilities beyond the amounts Congress has appropriated,” and bars “the borrowing of funds by federal agencies . . . in anticipation of future appropriations.”90 Finally, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 197491 (Impoundment Act) channels presidential authority to decline to expend appropriated funds.92 It responded to President Nixon’s expansive use of impoundment.93 Congress had no trouble rejecting Nixon’s claims despite a long history of such impoundments.94 While the Miscellaneous Receipts Act and the Anti-Deficiency Act appear to have succeeded, the Impoundment Act has a more mixed record. While the Supreme Court endorsed legislative constraints on presidential impoundment,95 President Gerald Ford increased impoundments through creative interpretations of the law.96 But two decades later, Congress concluded the executive had too little discretionary spending authority and expanded it by statute.97
86 Act of Mar 3, 1849 § 1, 9 Stat at 398. The act is subject to a number of exceptions, none of which are relevant here. See Stith, 97 Yale L J at 1365–70 (cited in note 83).
87 Act of July 12, 1870, 16 Stat 230, codified as amended in various sections of Title 31.
88 Act of Feb 27, 1906 § 3, 34 Stat 49.
89 See Act of July 12, 1870 § 7, 16 Stat at 251 (providing that no governmental department shall expend in one year more than the appropriations made by Congress for that year).
90 Stith, 97 Yale L J at 1371 (cited in note 83) (stating that the Anti-Deficiency Act prevents unauthorized prior executive obligations from undermining Congress’s power of the purse).
91 Pub L No 93-344, 88 Stat 297, codified as amended 2 USC §§ 681–92.
92 Impoundment Act §§ 1001–17, 88 Stat at 332–39. This Act “began the use of statutory framework laws in this area, including establishing the concurrent budget resolution, setting the stage for the reconciliation process, and ultimately providing points of order and other internal enforcement provisions to increase congressional authority over the federal purse.” Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J Contemp Legal Issues 717, 723 (2005).
93 See Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power 158–59 (Princeton 1975) (describing President Nixon’s claims to an impoundment power); id at 176 (“The Nixon impoundments were unprecedented in their scope and severity.”).
94 Whittington and Carpenter, 1 Persp Polit at 507 (cited in note 70).
95 See Train v City of New York, 420 US 35, 41 (1975) (finding no presidential authority to withhold funds under the Clean Water Act).
96 Fisher, Presidential Spending Power at 200 (cited in note 93).
97 See Line Item Veto Act, Pub L No 104-130, 110 Stat 1200 (1996), codified at 2 USC §§ 691–92, abrogated in Clinton v New York, 524 US 417 (1998).
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Moreover, statutory regulation of the purse furnishes a tool for judicial influence over the executive. Judicial action in turn magnifies congressional influence. A recent study of taxation litigation finds evidence that the federal courts interpret fiscal laws in a more pro-government fashion during military engagements supported by both Congress and the White House than in the course of unilateral executive military entanglements.
98 Although the resulting effect is hard to quantify, the basic finding of the study suggests that fiscal statutes trench on executive discretion not only directly, but also indirectly via judicially created incentives to act only with legislative endorsement.99
To be sure, a persistent difficulty in debates about congressional efficacy, and with some of the claims advanced in The Executive Unbound, is that it is unclear what baseline should be used to evaluate the outcomes of executive-congressional struggles. What counts, that is, as a “win” and for whom? What, for example, is an appropriate level of legislative control over expenditures? In the examples developed in this Part, I have underscored instances in which a law has been passed that a President disagrees with in substantial part, and where there are divergent legislative preferences reflected in the ultimate enactment. I do not mean to suggest, however, that there are not alternative ways of delineating a baseline for analysis.100
In sum, there is strong evidence that law and lawmaking institutions have played a more robust role in delimiting the bounds of executive discretion over the federal sword and the federal purse than The Executive Unbound intimates. Congress in fact impedes presidential agendas. The White House in practice cannot use
98 Nancy Staudt, The Judicial Power of the Purse: How Courts Fund National Defense in Times of Crisis 77–86, 106–07 (Chicago 2011) (finding that the Supreme Court decided taxation cases “in a manner that strongly supported the elected branches of government, thereby increasing the size of the fiscal pie” during World War I, World War II, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but not during the Korean, Vietnam, and First Gulf Wars).
99 It is also worth noting that the absence of conspicuous executive failures to get laws passed is not especially probative. The system of bicameralism and presentment created by Article I, § 7, creates conditions in which “players realize that their preferences may have to be compromised to guarantee the cooperation of other players as required by the constitutional structure.” William N. Eskridge Jr, Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 77 (Thomson West 4th ed 2007). Under those conditions, the executive’s request of Congress will itself be a function of what Congress is likely to accept. Presidents are likely to have good information about how Congress will respond to proposals, and little incentive to seem weak by pushing for a new law that will be denied.
100 I am grateful to Professor Trevor Morrison for emphasizing to me the significance of the baseline problem.
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presidential administration as a perfect substitute. Legislation implementing congressional control of the purse is also a significant, if imperfect, tool of legislative influence on the ground. This is true even when Presidents influence the budgetary agenda
101 and agencies jawbone their legislative masters into new funding.102 If Congress and statutory frameworks seem to have such nontrivial effects on the executive’s choice set, this at minimum implies that the conditions in which law matters are more extensive than The Executive Unbound suggests and that an account of executive discretion that omits law and legal institutions will be incomplete.
B. The Motivational Status of Law
But why should Presidents attend to statutory constraints or Congress in the first place? What stops Henry Paulson from proceeding with the bailout without waiting for new appropriations? Or President Obama from sua sponte issuing new debt or transferring Guantánamo detainees? The political economy developed in The Executive Unbound suggests that executive branch officials have no reason to heed legal and institutional constraints absent the possibility of credibility gains. PV also suggest that legislators and judges defer to the executive because of the latter’s superior institutional competence (pp 107–08).103 Recognizing the “inevitable” (p 103), they stay their hand rather than needlessly expend effort. This account of executive dominance, however, rests on an incomplete theory of political actors’ and judges’ motivations.104
PV’s rendition of the relevant motivations rests on rational choice foundations. Rational choice models take individuals as the
101 Some presidential control is a function of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 42 Stat 20, codified as amended in various sections of Title 31, (vesting the President with proposal power respecting many parts of the federal budget). See Dam, 44 U Chi L Rev at 278 (cited in note 81) (stating the Act was “designed to substitute central presidential planning for the prior practice” of individual agency submissions to Congress).
102 See generally Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 (Princeton 2001) (finding, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that mid-level administrators lobbied Congress to secure administrative reorderings).
103 PV further argue that legislators have “pragmatic reasons” to leave the executive with broad discretion (pp 107–08).
104 Consider Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences 107 (Cambridge 2007) (“[E]xplanation[s] of [ ] behavior must often appeal to [ ] beliefs about the motivations of others.”).
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central unit of analysis.
105 They assume individuals “form rational beliefs, including beliefs about the options available to them” and then take actions that maximize preferences “given [those] beliefs.”106 Rational choice explanations come in “thick” and “thin” forms.107 Thin forms make no assumptions about the content of individuals’ preferences; thick accounts do.108 The strong law/politics dichotomy rests on “thick” rational choice assumptions.109 Political actors and judges are not only utility maximizers, their utilities also have defined content. Specifically, they have preferences over first-order policy outcomes, but not over second-order goals such as legality and constitutionality.110
This distinction between first-order and second-order preferences is not explicitly stated in The Executive Unbound. But it is omnipresent. The sole reason the President recognizes constraints is to obtain credibility that yields further “power” to achieve particular policy ends (p 153). Legislators capitulate before executive initiatives because they recognize them to be “inescapable” (p 108). Judges “remain quiet” because they recognize the “sharp pragmatic limits” on what they can do (pp 35–37). In all these arguments, political actors and judges are characterized as acting on the basis of expected policy outcomes. The possibility that their choices will reflect normative preferences for legality and constitutionality with a “dimension of ‘oughtness’”111 does not enter the analysis.112
This account of first-order preferences, which underwrites the law/politics dichotomy, embodies controversial assumptions. Notice, at the threshold, that arguments from inevitability or inescapability
105 See Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice: A Critique of Applications in Political Science 16 (Yale 1994).
106 Elster, Explaining Social Behavior at 191 (cited in note 104). See also Jon Elster, Introduction, in Jon Elster, ed, Rational Choice 1, 5 (NYU 1986) (“The normatively proper decision criterion [in rational choice theory] under risk is to choose the option that maximizes expected utility.”).
107 See Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Usable Theory: Analytic Tools for Social and Political Research 30 (Princeton 2009); Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice at 17–18 (cited in note 105).
108 See Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice at 17–18 (cited in note 105).
109 In this regard, the dichotomy is consistent with much recent political science work, which also rests on “unambiguously thick-rational assumptions.” See id at 19.
110 For this reason, I do not believe it is adequate to defend the use of thick preferences based on the need for a parsimonious analytical framework. It is true, to be sure, that excluding normative preferences from the analysis makes the latter more tractable. But when that exclusion preordains the answer to the question whether law or politics is more effective, I think it is an unwarranted simplification.
111 Rueschemeyer, Usable Theory at 72 (cited in note 107).
112 Note that my argument here does not concern the limits of rationality, such as those imposed by bounded rationality. Rather it trains on the stipulated content of preferences.
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cannot be literally true either for the courts or the legislative branch. It is not impossible for judges to issue timely preliminary injunctions. Nor is Congress necessarily disabled from quick action, as its first-blush response to 9/11 demonstrates. Rather, the inevitability argument relies on an implicit, unstated claim that judges and legislators accept comparative institutional competence arguments in favor of executive-branch primacy.
113 Courts and Congress, that is, are said to refrain from acting because they recognize that “institutional capacities” make it “inevitable” for the executive to take the lead (p 105).114 But it is not at all clear whether judges and legislators accept the “essentially normative” claim that “our nation would be safer . . . if judges [or Congress] appropriately deferred to their [ ] presidents.”115 What judges and legislators believe is an empirical question, a question on which The Executive Unbound adduces no evidence. Absent an empirical foundation, it nonetheless seems implausible (at least to me) to assert that federal judges and legislators have uniformly internalized a controversial logic that teaches them their own impotence.116
Equally peculiar, the strong law/politics dichotomy omits normative preferences respecting legality and constitutionality from political actors’ calculus. It thus rests on a strong assumption about the narrowly consequential nature of executive branch actors’ utility function. This is of concern for three reasons. First, a model that makes the predicate assumption that political actors do not have preferences over legality or constitutionality will always find political restraints to be more effective than legal ones. It is not clear law can ever explain fully official behavior if political actors have preferences over policy outcomes, but not over the legality of the methods used to obtain those outcomes. H.L.A. Hart famously argued that law rests ultimately on the fact that “officials of the system” view it as the source of “common standards of official behaviour” against which they “appraise critically their own and each other’s deviations as lapses.”117 If Hart’s claim is correct, officials’ “acceptance” of
113 For an argument that at least in the national security context, claims of comparative institutional competence founded on the American Separation of Powers are surprisingly fragile, see Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 Cal L Rev (forthcoming 2012).
114 See also p 31.
115 William G. Howell, Presidential Power in War, 2011 Ann Rev Pol Sci 89, 101.
116 On the other hand, PV’s claim may have in practice the circular quality of a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, judges and legislators may come to believe that they are not institutionally qualified not out of direct experience but because they are repeatedly told so by influential commentators such as PV.
117 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 116–17 (Oxford 2d ed 1994).
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normative standards is the sociological fact upon which a modern legal system necessarily rests.
118 Absent such normative preferences, law has no grasp upon official behavior. In The Executive Unbound, it is categorically excluded from the domain of possible causes. By bracketing off normative preferences, the book thus stacks the explanatory deck against law.
Second, the omission of normative preferences about legality is in tension with the historical record.119 Ample evidence shows executive-branch officials to have normative preferences about legality and constitutionality. Deliberation on legal and constitutional questions within the executive branch is highly structured along channels that are reportedly entrenched.120 Recent insider accounts of national security lawmaking hence underscore thick “cultural norms” respecting the law within the executive branch, although they can also be read to suggest that the commitment to legality was occasionally uneven.121 Even the Bush administration, which has been accused of a cavalier attitude to the law, appeared to insist on the legality and constitutionality of its most controversial actions at some cost.122 There is also an extensive literature documenting how lawyers within the Justice Department take account of the normative force of law even when their clients within the executive branch are more cavalier.123
118 Id at 117. See also id at 6.
119 Consider Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy 3 (Chicago 1995) (criticizing the “empirically implausible view that human beings are, for the most part, instrumentally rational and naturally self-regarding”).
120 See Executive Order No 12146, 3 CFR 409, 411 (1980) (providing for coordinated legal review of constitutional questions within the executive). See also Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum L Rev 1448, 1470–92 (2010).
121 See Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush Administration 37 (Norton 2007). Goldsmith also explains how the availability of executive branch lawyers to argue “without any citation of authority” for sweeping executive power was a “godsend.” Id at 98.
122 See Benjamin A. Kleinerman, The Discretionary President: The Promise and Peril of Executive Power 4–5 (Kansas 2009) (describing and criticizing efforts to maintain legality during the Bush administration). It is especially worth noting that external accounts of military lawyers’ involvement in counterterrorism operations support the idea that law plays a role in their preferences. Goldsmith, Power and Constraint at 135–46 (cited in note 21) (discussing the influence of lawyers in targeting decisions).
123 See, for example, Trevor W. Morrison, Book Review, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 Harv L Rev 1688, 1707–30 (2011), reviewing Bruce Ackerman, Decline and Fall (cited in note 5); Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 Admin L Rev 1303, 1305–06, 1308–09 (2000). I am assuming here that such insider accounts of executive legality are accurate. But there is insufficient independent evidence to ascertain whether this is so, or to ascertain whether political superiors will manipulate the occasions for advice seeking or the sources of advice to obtain sought-after outcomes (although some of Professor Morrison’s recent empirical work does support the
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Of course, it is possible that all such anecdotal evidence reflects an optimistic hindsight bias on the part of insiders seeking to burnish their own credentials. I doubt this.124 It would indeed be surprising if federal officials did not generally take the law seriously given the normative force accorded to constitutional and legal norms in contemporary American society.125 All federal officers—not just lawyers within the Department of Justice—also swear or affirm a mandatory oath “to support this Constitution” before exercising their powers.126 Certainly it is conceivable that no federal official taking this oath has meaningful preferences over the constitutionality of his or her actions. This skeptical conclusion would be surprising, though, in light of the weak evidence that such oaths are routinely ignored.127
Alternatively, it may be that expressions of legalistic preferences are held only by lower-level officials, while senior policy makers have no illusions about the weak effect of the law. But recall that some of the examples of law talk I canvassed in the introduction came from senior policy makers, such as the President and the secretary of the treasury.128 To conclude that all use of legalism by senior officials is merely cheap talk without some substantial evidence on that score seems again incautious. This is especially so since both the President and the secretary of the treasury arguably paid a price in terms of nonattainment of policy preferences by sticking to their constitutional guns.
Third, where The Executive Unbound does take into account normative preferences, it does so by assimilating them to purely instrumental judgments about consequences. For example, PV claim courts will stay their hand because they lack “legitimacy.” Judges know they are ill-equipped to second-guess executive policy judg-ments, and so do not act for fear of losing public support (pp 30–31).129 This equates legitimacy with efficacy. It assumes judgments of legitimacy are correlated to policy outcomes. But that equation is inconsistent with available evidence. Studies of legitimacy do not
conclusions drawn here). See Morrison, 124 Harv L Rev at 1718 (cited in note 123). To some extent, therefore, my argument here rests on empirical points that are necessarily impressionistic. I am grateful to Professor Vermeule for pressing me on this last point.
124 To be clear, I draw here on no executive-branch experience of my own.
125 See, for example, Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 9–53 (Princeton 1988) (examining the Constitution as the source of a “civil religion”).
126 US Const Art VI, § 3.
127 See note 123. See also Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 Va L Rev 253, 259 (1996).
128 See notes 4, 18, and accompanying text.
129 PV argue that courts defer to the executive because of a “legitimacy deficit” (p 30).
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show that views of, for example, the Supreme Court are a function of outcomes. To the contrary, support for the Court “has little to do with ideology or partisanship” but “is grounded in broader commitments to democratic institutions and processes.”
130 And external legitimacy judgments of law enforcement bodies, even in the fraught context of national security, are not driven by perceptions of efficiency but by ideals of fairness and procedural justice.131 Scholars of all ideological stripes tend to endorse the notion that “a reputation for restraint and commitment to the rule of law” will “legitimate the extraordinary powers the President must exercise in the long term” against national security threats.132 Cross-national studies of legitimacy also identify a complex bundle of legitimacy predictors, including participation rights, welfare rights, and accountability.133
The Executive Unbound’s view of legitimacy is in any event symptomatic of a more diffuse skepticism of normative preferences. No doubt this captures the standpoint of some official actors, who really do take the perspective of a Holmesian bad man. But that seems inadequate as a more general description of contemporary political actors’ beliefs and motivations. Foolishly or not, American officials often appear to hold strong views about legality and the Constitution. A positive political economy of executive constraint and discretion is surely incomplete without an accounting of those preferences.
C. Political Theory and Legal Constraint
A third strand of The Executive Unbound’s skepticism about legal constraints is its critique of the Madisonian theory of separation of powers (pp 19–31). Liberal legalism is said to be inadequate
130 James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and Confirmations: Positivity Theory and the Judgments of the American People 61 (Princeton 2009). See also Gregory A. Caldeira and James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 Am J Pol Sci 635, 644–45 (1992) (reporting no relationship between diffuse support for the Court and specific policy goals).